Three sanctioned tankers and an Iranian fishing boat spent days drifting directly over major undersea Internet cables in the Gulf of Oman near the Strait of Hormuz in October 2026, according to tracking data and satellite imagery gathered by maritime intelligence firm Windward. The ships carried no commercial cargo and had no commercial reason to stop. The pattern, Windward told the Financial Times, suggests the vessels may have been mapping cable routes, or placing charges or mines while dark.
What the Ships Were Doing
Windward tracked the vessels using both AIS ship-tracking data and satellite images. The ships slowed, looped around near multiple cable corridors, and in some cases switched off their automatic identification system transponders entirely, a practice known as going dark. Windward published its findings in a blog post on October 26, naming two sanctioned tankers linked to Iran that spent days drifting over regional cable corridors with their transponders disabled.
Six active cables currently cross the Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Middle East to Europe, Africa, and Asia. Two more cables are under construction in the region. One of those, the 2Africa cable, is owned by a consortium that includes Meta. That cable corridor was among those visited by the Iran-linked ships.
Who Depends on These Cables
Four countries depend entirely on the cables running through the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint: Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. Cut those cables and each of those nations loses its connection to the global Internet. The exposure extends further. Alan Mauldin, research director at telecommunications research firm TeleGeography, told Reuters that less than one percent of international bandwidth passes through the Strait of Hormuz, which limits the global impact of any attack. But the regional impact would be severe. One third of India’s westbound Internet traffic passes through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.
Multiple cable cuts could slow Internet services and disrupt financial transactions, e-commerce, and cloud computing, analysts told Reuters. The duration of any disruption would depend heavily on how quickly repair ships could reach the damaged cables.
Iran’s Warnings and Detailed Plans
The ship movements follow a string of public threats from Iranian officials. Yadollah Javani, deputy head of political affairs for Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, said Iran could target seven major Internet cables beneath the Strait of Hormuz if Iranian infrastructure came under attack. Two senior Iranian security officials, speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, confirmed that Tehran has drawn up detailed plans to target undersea communications cables in the Gulf if the United States and Israel attack Iran again.
One of those officials said Iran would aim to prevent repairs after any attack to extend the disruption. “If Iran is attacked, there will be no more red lines,” the official said, adding that Iran had full access to the undersea cables and could easily destroy them. The official warned the Gulf states that they should hold Washington, not Tehran, responsible for any damage to undersea cables.
Top security official Mohsen Rezaei warned this month that US-linked digital infrastructure across the Gulf, including data centers and AI facilities, could be targeted in a renewed conflict.
The Conflict Context
The United States and Israel launched a major military campaign against Iran in February 2026. Since then, Iran’s response has included attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, strikes on oil refineries and energy infrastructure, and hits on airports in several Gulf countries. Iran has also specifically targeted US technology infrastructure in the region. Multiple drone strikes hit Amazon data centers, causing what Ars Technica reported as permanent loss of customer data. In May 2026, a spokesperson for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed Iran would impose fees on Internet cables belonging to US tech companies and other owners.
President Donald Trump escalated the rhetoric at the United Nations on September 22, warning he could annihilate Iran. After that speech, Iranian officials moved from fee threats to explicit cable-attack warnings.
The Deterrence Calculation
Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran program at the Middle East Institute in Washington, told Reuters that the threats are intended to deter renewed conflict and to pressure Washington through its Gulf allies and corporate partners. “Tehran wants Gulf states and corporate executives to press Trump over the risks his policies pose to their investment plans,” Vatanka said.
That interpretation fits the broader pattern. The second Iranian security official told Reuters that Gulf states, which have invested heavily in data centers and AI facilities across the region, should factor those investments into their assessment of US policy risks.
A Pattern Seen Elsewhere
The behavior of the Iran-linked ships near the Hormuz cables mirrors documented incidents elsewhere. The Jamestown Foundation reported in February 2025 that Chinese and Russian-linked merchant vessels had been loitering near Taiwan’s undersea cables, with one vessel, the Vasili Shukshin, spending nearly a month close to Taiwan’s Fangshan undersea cable landing station with no commercial purpose. A Center for Strategic and International Studies report found that Chinese research vessels were spending more time loitering near Pacific undersea cables than vessels from any other nation, using what analysts described as lawnmower patterns that suggest systematic seafloor mapping.
A 2025 US congressional report highlighted that China has developed electric cutting devices capable of severing armored cables at depths of up to 13,000 feet. Iranian officials have not publicly described the technical methods they would use, though one senior security official told Reuters that Iran has full access to the cables.
What Remains Unknown
Windward’s analysis stops short of confirming that the Iran-linked ships actually placed any devices on the cables. The firm’s conclusion is that the behavioral pattern is consistent with mapping or mine placement, but the evidence from satellite imagery and AIS data alone cannot distinguish between the two possibilities. Neither the US Department of State nor Iran’s Foreign Ministry responded to Reuters’ requests for comment on the Iranian officials’ statements. No Gulf state governments issued immediate comment.
The question that analysts and governments cannot yet answer publicly is whether the ships were gathering targeting data for a future decision, or whether the operation was already further along. The fact that Iran’s officials chose to make the threat explicit while the ships were active adds weight to the concern that the loitering was not simply reconnaissance.
This article draws on reporting from Ars Technica, Reuters, TIME, and the Jamestown Foundation.
Which countries would lose Internet access if Iran cut the Strait of Hormuz cables?
Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar depend entirely on undersea cables running through the Strait of Hormuz. One third of India’s westbound Internet traffic also passes through that corridor.
What did the Iranian ships do near the undersea cables?
Maritime intelligence firm Windward tracked three sanctioned Iranian tankers and a fishing boat loitering directly over cable corridors, then switching off their AIS transponders. Windward said the behavior is consistent with mapping cable routes or placing mines.
How serious would a cable attack in the Strait of Hormuz be for global Internet?
TeleGeography research director Alan Mauldin told Reuters that less than one percent of international bandwidth passes through the Strait, limiting global impact. Regional disruption would be severe, however, cutting off multiple Gulf states and slowing services including financial transactions and cloud computing.
Want to go deeper? Ask NEX, the Decrypted Matrix research assistant, about the documents behind this story. It indexes every article here the day it is published and cites its sources.
