John Young – Architect, Blogger, Activist

John Young – Architect, Blogger, Activist

john-young-cryptome

 

John Young Architect, Cryptologist, Leak Facilitator, Cryptome.org Founder

John Young is a wise, seasoned, and ‘angry’ citizen determined to expose corruption and abhorrent secrecy.  He is currently living in New York, doing architectural work for some of the most powerful members of the political establishment that he has sworn to attack. “It’s an easy way to make money in New York, to do corrupt work,” he says with a shrug.

Young on .gov tactics:

“Assassination Politics,” is what Young described as “an imaginative and sophisticated prospective for improving governmental accountability by way of a scheme for anonymous, untraceable political assassination.”

Interesting, Young disclosed the fact on Cryptome in 2000:

“My father-in-law was a longtime career officer in the Central Intelligence Agency, one of its earliest members, and chief of station in several countries…. He’s not talking to Cryptome, and that’s regrettable, for I believe such knowledgeable persons should disclose everything they know about the global culture of secret intelligence and its profound effects – to better inform citizens on the true way their governments function.”

Cryptome.org

Cryptome warns visitors that it does not promise security, that is responsibility of visitors. To not believe security promises by others.

Cryptome Public Key 11 June 2013. New PK for cryptome[at]earthlink.net
Key ID: 0x8B3BF75C

—–BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK—–
Version: PGP Universal 2.9.1 (Build 347)
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=gjKZ
—–END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK—–

John Young Architect: http://jya.nyc
Special Inspections: http://jya.nyc/special-inspections.htm

John Young – Architect, Blogger, Activist

Secrets, As Described by John Young of Cryptome.org

To: “Whalen, Jeanne” <Jeanne.Whalen[at]wsj.com>
From: John Young <jya[at]pipeline.com>
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 2010 12:45 +0600
Subject: RE: from the WSJ

Jeanne,

Following up our telephone exchange on Friday:

1. You said the WSJ editor turned down the use of Rupert Murdoch’s
penthouse for an inteview because editorial and business are kept
separate and Murdoch is business. That is hoarily disingenuous for
no media keeps editorial and business separate, the two are
inseparable with business always in control.

2. I said there is no need for me to comment further on Wikileaks,
the story is now a churn of publicity stunts by Wikileaks, its
supporters and detractors.

3. You said there was interest in reporting on Cryptome in addition
to Wikileaks. I said that is another story, not related to Wikileaks.

To amplify 3, Cryptome shares with Wikileaks and many others
older and newer, the aim of reducing secrecy in government,
business, organizations, institutions and individuals.

Pervasive secrecy corrupts as an essential protector of those who
want control and manipulate the citzenry and subjects. Those who
advocate secrecy always justify it by claims of threats that require
secrecy to prevent or fight.

In truth, secrecy protects and empowers those who use it and
weakens those for whom it is invoked to protect.

Secrecy hides privilege, incompetence and deception of
those who depend on it and who would be disempowered
without it.

The very few legitimate uses of secrecy have served as the
seed for unjustified expanded and illegitimate uses.

A vast global enterprise of governments, institutions, organizations,
businesses and individuals dependent up the secrecy of abuse
of secrecy has evolved into an immensely valuable practice whose
cost to the public and benefits to its practitioners are concealed
by secrecy.

Secrecy has led to a very large undergournd criminal enterprise
dealing with stolen, forged, faked, and planted “secret” information
involving governments, businesses, NGOs, institutions and
individuals. Its value likely exceeds that of the drug trade, with
which it works in concert to hide assets, procedures and operators
that is keep the secrets in emulation of the secretkeepers.

Ex-secretkeepers are involved in this undergroung enterprise
as beneficiares, informants, facilitators of exchanges with
the agoveground secretkeepers and as spies for hire.

Secrecy is the single most threatening practice against democracy
and democratic procedures such that it is highly likely that there is
no democracy or democratic institutions unsullied by secrecy.

Secrecy poses the greatest threat to the United States because
it divides the poplulation into two groups, those with access to
secret information and those without. This asymmetrial access
to information vital to the United States as a democracy will
eventually turn it into an autocracy run by those with access
to secret informaton, protected by laws written to legitimate
this privileged access and to punish those who violate these
laws.

Those with access to secret information cannot honestly
partake in public discourse due to the requirement to lie
and dissumlate about what is secret information. They can
only speak to one another never in public. Similarly those
without access to secret information cannot fully
debate the issues which affect the nation, including
alleged threats promulagsted by secretkeepers who
are forbidden by law to disclose what they know.

Senator Patrick Moynihan, among others, has explored
the damaging consequences of excessive secrecy. Attempts
to debate these consequences have been suppressed
or distorted by secrecy practices and laws.

Efforts, governmental and private, to diminish secrecy
have had modest effects, and the amount of secret information
continues to grow virtually unchecked and concealed by
the very means questioned, secrecy itself.

These secrecy-reduction efforts are continually being attacked
by the secrets enterprise by secrecy-wielding oveseers, including
presidents, legislators and the courts.

While some of the privileged media challenge these practices,
most do not and thereby reinforce the unsavory.

It should not be surprising that this leads to an increase in
efforts to challenge secrecy practices by those excluded,
including such initiatives as, among many others around
the globe, Cryptome and Wikileaks.

Cryptome disagrees with the use of secrecy by Wikileaks
and its monetization of secret information which mimics
those it ostensibly opposes, say, Rupert Murdoch, among
untold others.

John

TOR Made for USG Open Source Spying Says Maker

TOR Made for USG Open Source Spying Says Maker

Donate $25 for two DVDs of the Cryptome collection of files from June 1996 to the present

16 April 2011. A sends: Roger Dingledine writes that the US Navy uses Tor for open source spying:

http://idtrail.org/files/Dingledine%20-%20Tor.pdf

28 March 2011. Add comments from 1997 on TOR, called then the Onion Router.

25 March 2011. Add messages from A3 and JY.

24 March 2011. Add message from A and EFF.

 


22 March 2011

Creators of TOR:
David M. Goldschlag <goldschlag[at]itd.nrl.navy.mil>
Michael G. Reed <reed[at]itd.nrl.navy.mil>
Paul F. Syverson <syverson[at]itd.nrl.navy.mil>
Naval Research Laboratory

More:

http://www.onion-router.net/Publications/IH-1996.pdf
http://www.isoc.org/inet97/proceedings/F7/F7_1.HTM
http://www.onion-router.net/

 


TOR Made for USG Open Source Spying Says Maker

Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2011 16:57:39 -0400
From: Michael Reed <reed[at]inet.org>
To: tor-talk[at]lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Iran cracks down on web dissident technology

On 03/22/2011 12:08 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 22, 2011 at 11:23 AM, Joe Btfsplk<joebtfsplk[at]gmx.com>  wrote:
>> Why would any govt create something their enemies can easily use against
>> them, then continue funding it once they know it helps the enemy, if a govt
>> has absolutely no control over it?  It's that simple.  It would seem a very
>> bad idea.  Stop looking at it from a conspiracy standpoint&  consider it as
>> a common sense question.
> Because it helps the government as well. An anonymity network that
> only the US government uses is fairly useless. One that everyone uses
> is much more useful, and if your enemies use it as well that's very
> good, because then they can't cut off access without undoing their own
> work.

BINGO, we have a winner!  The original *QUESTION* posed that led to the
invention of Onion Routing was, "Can we build a system that allows for
bi-directional communications over the Internet where the source and
destination cannot be determined by a mid-point?"  The *PURPOSE* was for
DoD / Intelligence usage (open source intelligence gathering, covering
of forward deployed assets, whatever).  Not helping dissidents in
repressive countries.  Not assisting criminals in covering their
electronic tracks.  Not helping bit-torrent users avoid MPAA/RIAA
prosecution.  Not giving a 10 year old a way to bypass an anti-porn
filter.  Of course, we knew those would be other unavoidable uses for
the technology, but that was immaterial to the problem at hand we were
trying to solve (and if those uses were going to give us more cover
traffic to better hide what we wanted to use the network for, all the
better...I once told a flag officer that much to his chagrin).  I should
know, I was the recipient of that question from David, and Paul was
brought into the mix a few days later after I had sketched out a basic
(flawed) design for the original Onion Routing.

The short answer to your question of "Why would the government do this?"
is because it is in the best interests of some parts of the government
to have this capability...  Now enough of the conspiracy theories...

-Michael
_______________________________________________
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk[at]lists.torproject.org

24 March 2011

A sends:

From: A
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 01:41:41 +0000
Subject: Cryptome Fwd: Re: Fwd: The onion TOR network
To: cryptome[at]earthlink.net
Following the publication of the email extract on TOR, I asked
the EFF what they made of it. Here it is. You can of course publish it.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Rebecca Jeschke <rebecca[at]eff.org>
Date: 23 March 2011 21:29
Subject: Fwd: Re: Fwd: The onion TOR network
To: A
Hi A.  This is from Senior Staff Technologist Seth Schoen.  Thanks -- Rebecca
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: Fwd: The onion TOR network
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2011 11:15:24 -0700
From: Seth David Schoen <schoen[at]eff.org>
To: Rebecca Jeschke <rebecca[at]eff.org>
CC: chris <chris[at]eff.org>, Peter Eckersley <pde[at]eff.org>,
    Seth Schoen <schoen[at]eff.org>
Rebecca Jeschke writes:

     any thoughts on this?
It's totally true that the military people who invented Tor were
thinking about how to create a system that would protect military communications.  The current iteration of that is described at 
https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en#military 
right on the Tor home page. 
However, the Tor developers also became clear early on that the system wouldn't protect military communications well unless it had a very diverse set of users.  Elsewhere in that same e-mail discussion, Mike Perry (a current Tor developer) alludes to this: 
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2011-March/019898.html 
  In fact, the best known way we have right now to improve anonymity   is to support more users, and more *types* of users. See: 
  http://www.freehaven.net/doc/wupss04/usability.pdf   http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-weis06.pdf 
The first link is to a paper called "Anonymity Loves Company", which explains the issue this way: 
  No organization can build this infrastructure for its own sole use.   If a single corporation or government agency were to build a private   network to protect its operations, any connections entering or   leaving that network would be obviously linkable to the controlling   organization. The members and operations of that agency would be   easier, not harder, to distinguish. 
  Thus, to provide anonymity to any of its users, the network must   accept traffic from external users, so the various user groups can   blend together. 
You can read the entire (ongoing) discussion about government funding for Tor development via 
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2011-March/thread.html 
(search for "[tor-talk] Iran cracks down on web dissident technology"). 
-- 
Seth Schoen Senior Staff Technologist                         schoen[at]eff.org Electronic Frontier Foundation                    https://www.eff.org/ 454 Shotwell Street, San Francisco, CA  94110     +1 415 436 9333 x107 

Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Iran cracks down on web dissident technology
From: A3
To: John Young <jya[at]pipeline.com>
Cc: A2, cypherpunks[at]al-qaeda.net

On Tue, 2011-03-22 at 17:43 -0400, John Young wrote:
> Fucking amazing admission. No conspiracy theory needed.

Wasn't this already very common knowledge?

Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Iran cracks down on web dissident technology
To: A3, A2, cypherpunks[at]al-qaeda.net
From: John Young <jya[at]pipeline.com>

That's what the Eff-folks advocating TOR are saying. And point to a
file on Torproject.org. See:

http://cryptome.org/0003/tor-spy.htm

However, this appears to be a giant evasion perhaps a subterfuge,
even reminds of what Big Boys say when customers learn they are
siphoning customer data. Read the privacy policy the lawyer-advised
apologists bark, and upon reading the privacy policy see that it only
emphasizes the subterfuge. Openly admitting siphoning is supposed
to make it okay because everyone does it under cover of lockstep
privacy policy. Reject that.

If the Tor operators really know what they are being used for, then
they should admit to being agents of the USG, as Michael Reed had
the guts to do.

Claiming this US spying role for Tor is well known is a crock of slop,
but then spies lie all the time and care not a whit that they peddle
shit for eaters of it. If you believe them and like what they do then
don't shilly-shally, just do what Michael Reed did but others are
too ashamed to do after having been duped since 1996.

If Reed's precedent for honesty is followed, there will be an
admission that the Internet was invented for spying by its inventor.
And then cryptography and other comsec tools. And then cellphones
and the like. Hold on now, this is getting out of hand, the apologists
will bellow, everybody has always known that there is no privacy
in digital world.

Actually, no, they did not. And those who knew keep their Janusian
mouths writhing to reap the rewards of deception. Now that is a truth
everyone knows. No conspiracy theory needed.

http://cryptome.org/jya/onion.htm25 April 1997: Add Lucky Green’s comments.
3 March 1997 (Thanks to LG for pointer)


Date: Sun, 02 Mar 1997 18:20:49 -0800
To: cryptography[at]c2.net, coderpunks[at]toad.com, weidai[at]eskimo.com
From: Lucky Green <shamrock[at]netcom.com>
Subject: PipeNet implemented?

At the FC’97 rump session, Paul Syverson from NRL presented a paper titled “Onion Routing”. The description of the system sounds very much like Wei Dai’s PipeNet. However, the development team seems to be unaware of PipeNet and the discussions about it that we had in the past.

NLR has currently five machines implementing the protocol. Connection setup time is claimed to be 500 ms. They are looking for volunteers to run “Onion Routers”. It appears the US military wants to access websites without giving away the fact that they are accessing the sites and is looking to us to provide the cover traffic. What a fortunate situation.

They said that the source would soon be on the web page, but so far it has not appeared.

http://www.itd.nrl.navy.mil/ITD/5540/projects/onion-routing/

 


To: cypherpunks[at]cyberpass.net
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 1997 01:24:29 -0700
From: Lucky Green <shamrock[at]netcom.com>
Subject: Re: A new system for anonymity on the web

At 12:59 PM 4/20/97 -0700, Steve Schear wrote:

>Hal,
>
>What do you think of the “onion routing” approach from the group at Naval
>Postgraduate? How would compare it to this newest proposal?

Neither one of them is any good in its present form. The folks at the FC’97 rump session got to watch Jim and myself poke truck sized holes into the NRL design within seconds of them ending their presentation. :-)

Here was a US military research lab presenting a system they thought would give them a way to surf the Net anonymously by using the public for cover traffic. [Let me just spell out here that I believe that the people from NRL and Cypherpunks are on the same side on this issue. Their concern is COMSEC, not SIGINT.]

Anyway, we knew how to crack their system without even having to think about it, since folks on Cypherpunks, especially Wei Dai, had discovered various venues of attack on such systems long ago. Cypherpunks are teaching the military about traffic analysis. :-)

The one good thing about NRL is that they seem to be willing to learn. [The other being that they get paid to write our code for us.] Though I get the distinct feeling that they don’t like the required solution. There is simply no way to harden the system against attack without using a constant or at least slowly varying (I would guess we are talking about periods of several hours here, certainly not minutes, but I haven’t done the math, nor do I have the time to do so) bandwidth data stream between the end user and the first Onion Router. This will invariably require special software on the end user’s machine. I think the best design would be a client side proxy. [That much Crowds got right.]

As to Crowds, they got to be kidding. How many end users are willing to become, even without their direct knowledge, the last hop to <enter evil URL here>? I believe that relatively few users would want their IP address to be the one showing up in the server log of <enter seized machine’s name here> because their jondo happened to be the exit point chosen.

 

 

— Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock[at]netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred

“I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence.” Mahatma Gandhi

http://cryptome.org/0003/tor-spy.htm