The FBI Communities Against Terrorism Program and Military Surplus Stores
In August 2011, the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force circulated a bulletin titled Communities Against Terrorism to military surplus store owners in Colorado. The document was part of a broader federal initiative to enlist private businesses in identifying potential terrorist activity. What made this particular bulletin controversial was its focus on purchasing behaviors that closely aligned with mainstream emergency preparedness practices.
The guidelines asked store owners and employees to watch for customers who demanded privacy regarding their identity, insisted on cash-only transactions, or made bulk purchases of specific items. The flagged products included weatherproofed ammunition containers, Meals Ready to Eat (MREs), night vision devices, gas masks, high-capacity magazines, and rifle bipods or tripods.
How the Guidelines Defined Suspicious Behavior
Beyond purchasing patterns, the bulletin instructed store personnel to note customers who expressed what it termed “extreme religious statements” or made comments perceived as anti-government or endorsing violence. The document also flagged individuals who demonstrated interest in product uses inconsistent with the items’ intended purpose, or who appeared to possess limited knowledge about what they were buying.
Store owners who identified such behavior were encouraged to contact the Denver Joint Terrorism Task Force or the Colorado Information Analysis Center. The bulletin acknowledged that individual activities, taken in isolation, could be entirely innocent and should be evaluated by law enforcement within a broader investigative context.
A Pattern Across Multiple States
The Colorado bulletin was not an isolated document. A nearly identical memo had been distributed to gun stores across states ranging from Connecticut to Utah. This suggested a coordinated federal effort to extend counter-terrorism monitoring into everyday retail environments. The consistent messaging across multiple states and store types indicated that the program represented a deliberate policy approach rather than a one-off initiative from a single field office.
The inclusion of items like MREs and weatherproofed containers on a terrorism indicator list drew particular scrutiny. These products are standard supplies for outdoor enthusiasts, hunters, campers, and emergency preparedness practitioners. Their presence on the list meant that millions of Americans engaged in perfectly legal activities could theoretically meet the bulletin’s criteria for suspicious behavior.
Questions About Scope and Civil Liberties
The bulletin raised fundamental questions about the boundaries of domestic counter-terrorism efforts. By casting such a wide net over routine commercial transactions and constitutionally protected speech, the program risked normalizing surveillance of lawful behavior. The inclusion of identity privacy concerns and cash payments as suspicious indicators touched on activities that many Americans consider basic rights rather than markers of criminal intent.
The program illustrated a tension that persisted throughout the post-September 11 security landscape: the challenge of balancing proactive threat detection with protections against the over-monitoring of ordinary citizens going about their daily lives.
