Leaked Emails Linked Private Military Contractor to Libyan and Syrian Operations

Emails obtained from the private intelligence firm Stratfor and published by WikiLeaks revealed that a former Blackwater director who led a private security company played an active role in the Libyan civil war and was subsequently tasked with contacting the Syrian opposition on behalf of American interests.

James F. Smith, then CEO of SCG International, described his background as CIA in correspondence with Stratfor. His company, he wrote, was composed of former Department of Defense, CIA, and law enforcement personnel, providing training, security, and intelligence collection services.

From Libya to Syria: A Contractor’s Expanding Role

According to the leaked emails, Smith and his firm were contracted to protect members of Libya’s National Transitional Council and to train rebel fighters after the implementation of the no-fly zone in March 2011. Stratfor assigned Smith the source codename LY700, and he provided intelligence on developments inside Libya, including information about missing surface-to-air missiles from Libyan military stockpiles.

In one email, a Stratfor official noted that Smith had “taken part” in the killing of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011. The precise nature of his involvement was not elaborated upon in the correspondence.

One of Smith’s contacts during the Libyan conflict was Mehdi al-Harati, an Irish-Libyan who commanded the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade and served as deputy commander of the Tripoli Military Council before resigning in October 2011.

Congressional Cover for Syrian Opposition Contact

In a December 2011 email to Stratfor’s vice president for counter-terrorism, Smith described a new assignment. He and Walid Phares — a Lebanese-American political commentator who at the time co-chaired Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s Middle East advisory group — were reportedly receiving political cover from Congresswoman Sue Myrick of North Carolina to engage Syrian opposition figures in Turkey.

The stated purpose was a congressional “fact finding mission,” but Smith told Stratfor that the “true mission” was to determine how the team could “help in regime change.” Smith also indicated he intended to offer his company’s protective services to Syrian opposition members, replicating the role he had performed in Libya.

The email further noted that Booz Allen Hamilton, a major American consulting firm with extensive government defense contracts, was “also working with the Agency on a similar request” — an apparent reference to the CIA.

The Stratfor Connection

Smith’s relationship with Stratfor began in February 2011 when he contacted founder George Friedman to praise the firm’s intelligence analysis. The correspondence was forwarded to Fred Burton, Stratfor’s counter-terrorism vice president, who cultivated Smith as an intelligence source over the following months.

When Burton learned of Smith’s Syria assignment, he requested that Stratfor analysts prepare a detailed briefing on the Syrian opposition. A 14-page document was produced cataloging key opposition groups and their leaders.

The email trail ended on December 13, 2011, with Burton noting that his source was “meeting with specific people described as key leaders” within the Syrian opposition. Shortly after, Stratfor’s mail servers were compromised in a hack, and the emails were subsequently published.

Private Military Contractors in American Foreign Policy

The correspondence illustrated the role that private military and security companies played in American foreign policy operations during the Arab Spring period. The emails suggested a pattern in which contractors who gained experience and contacts in one conflict zone were redeployed to the next — moving from Libya to Syria as American strategic attention shifted.

The involvement of a sitting congresswoman, a presidential campaign adviser, and a major defense consulting firm in what was described internally as a regime change effort raised questions about the oversight mechanisms governing private contractor involvement in covert or semi-covert foreign policy operations.