The Feds raid the home of unofficial Anonymous spokesperson Barrett Brown.
They’re after his Twitter records, chat logs, IRC conversations, his computer, and apparently everything else, according to the search warrant obtained by BuzzFeed.
Last month, the FBI raided the Dallas home of Barrett Brown, the journalist and unofficial spokesperson for the Internet hacktivist group Anonymous.
According to the search warrant, the agents were after any information from Brown involving a “conspiracy to access without authorization computers,” one of three serious charges listed in the document.
The Feds seized Brown’s computer and cellphone, searched his parent’s home as well, and demanded his Twitter records, chat logs, IRC conversations, Pastebin info, all his Internet browsing activity, and almost any form of electronic communications Brown conducted.
The warrant, exclusively obtained by BuzzFeed, suggests the government is primarily after information related to Anonymous and the hacking group Lulzec.
The authorities also appear to be interested in info on two private intelligence contracting firms, HBGary and EndGame Systems, two companies Brown has frequently clashed with and criticized on a website he founded called Echelon2.
Brown, a 30 year old journalist who has written for Vanity Fair and the Guardian, is perhaps the most high profile target thus far in the FBI’s investigation into a series of hacks that have shaken the corporate and defense establishment.
Brown, currently at work on a book about Anonymous, believes he’s being wrongly investigated. “I haven’t been charged with anything at this point, although there’s a sealed affidavit to which neither I nor my attorney have access,” he emailed BuzzFeed. “I suspect that the FBI is working off of incorrect information.”
This is a guide with which even a total noob can get high class security for his system and complete anonymity online. But its not only for noobs, it contains a lot of tips most people will find pretty helpfull. It is explained so detailed even the biggest noobs can do it^^ :
=== The Ultimate Guide for Anonymous and Secure Internet Usage v1.0.1 ===
By the time you are finished reading and implementing this guide, you will be able to securely and anonymously browse any website and to do so anonymously. No one not even your ISP or a government agent will be able to see what you are doing online. If privacy and anonymity is important to you, then you owe it to yourself to follow the instructions that are presented here.
In order to prepare this guide for you, I have used a computer that is running Windows Vista. This guide will work equally well for other versions of Windows. If you use a different operating system, you may need to have someone fluent in that operating system guide you through this process. However, most parts of the process are easily duplicated in other operating systems.
I have written this guide to be as newbie friendly as possible. Every step is fully detailed and explained. I have tried to keep instructions explicit as possible. This way, so long as you patiently follow each step, you will be just fine.
In this guide from time to time you will be instructed to go to certain URLs to download files. You do NOT need TOR to get these files, and using TOR (while possible) will make these downloads very slow.
This guide may appear overwhelming. Every single step is explained thoroughly and it is just a matter of following along until you are done. Once you are finished, you will have a very secure setup and it will be well worth the effort. Even though the guide appears huge, this whole process should take at the most a few hours. You can finish it in phases over the course of several days.
It is highly recommended that you close *ALL* applications running on your computer before starting.
We are Anonymous. You know who you are. The men behind the curtain, the overlord pulling at the strings of your puppets.
You hide and you plan and you scheme in the dark alleys; in the vehement anticipation that your draconic plans will come to fruitation. The dreams of a thousand men crystallized in one moment; one moment that approaches with every hour that passes. The time is upon us.
The Occupy Wall Street protests have been going on for a month. And it seems the FBI and NYPD have had help tracking protesters’ moves thanks to a conservative computer security expert who gained access to one of the group’s internal mailing lists,and then handed over information on the group’s plans to authorities and corporations targeted by protesters.
Since the Occupy Wall Street protest began on September 17, New York security consultant Thomas Ryan has been waging a campaign to infiltrate and discredit the movement. Ryan says he’s done contract work for the U.S. Army and he brags on his blog that he leads “a team called Black Cell, a team of the most-highly trained and capable physical, threat and cyber security professionals in the world.” But over the past few weeks, he and his computer security buddies have been spending time covertly attending Occupy Wall Street meetings, monitoring organizers’ social media accounts, and hanging out with protesters in Lower Manhattan.
As part of their intelligence-gathering operation, the group gained access to a listserv used by Occupy Wall Street organizers called September17discuss. On September17discuss, organizers hash out tactics and plan events, conduct post-mortems of media appearances, and trade the latest protest gossip. On Friday, Ryan leaked thousands of September17discuss emails to conservative blogger Andrew Breitbart, who is now using them to try to smear Occupy Wall Street as an anarchist conspiracy to disrupt global markets.
What may much more alarming to Occupy Wall Street organizers is that while Ryan was monitoring September17discuss, he was forwarding interesting email threads to contacts at the NYPD and FBI, including special agent Jordan T. Loyd, a member of the FBI’s New York-based cyber security team.
On September 18th, the day after the protest’s start, Ryan forwarded an email exchange between Occupy Wall Street organizers to Loyd. The email exchange is harmless: Organizers discuss how they need to increase union participation in the protest. “We need more outreach to workers. The best way to do that is by showing solidarity with them,” writes organizer Jackie DiSalvo in the thread. She then lists a group of potential unions to work with.
Another organizer named Conor responds: “+1,000,000 to Jackie’s proposal on working people/union struggles outreach and solidarity. Also, why not invite people to protest Troy Davis’s execution date at Liberty Plaza this Monday?”
Five minutes after Conor sent his email, Ryan forwarded the thread—with no additional comment—to Loyd’s FBI email address. “Thanks!” Loyd responded. He cc’d his colleague named Ilhwan Yum, a fellow cybersecurity expert at the agency, on the reply.
On September 26th, Ryan forwarded another email thread to Agent Loyd. But this time he clued in the NYPD as well, sending the email to Dennis Dragos, a detective with the NYPD Computer Crimes Squad.
The NYPD might have been very grateful he did so, since it involved a proposed demonstration outside NYPD headquarters at 1 Police Plaza. In the thread, organizers debated whether to crash an upcoming press conference planned by marijuana advocates to celebrate NYPD commissioner Ray Kelly ordering officers to halt arrests over possession of small amounts of marijuana.
“Should we bring some folks from Liberty Plaza to chant “SHAME” for the NYPD’s recent brutalities on Thursday night for the Troy Davis and Saturday for the Occupy Wall Street march?” asked one person in the email thread. (That past Saturday, the video of NYPD officer Anthony Bologna pepper-spraying a protester had gone viral.) Ryan promptly forwarded the email thread to Loyd at the FBI and Dragos at the NYPD.
Interestingly, it was Ryan who revealed himself as a snitch. We learned of these emails from the archive Ryan leaked yesterday in the hopes of undermining the Occupy Wall Street movement. In assembling the archive of September17discuss emails, it appears he accidentally included some of his own forwarded emails indicating he was ratting out organizers.
“I don’t know, I just put everything I had into one big package,” Ryan said when asked how the emails ended up in the file posted to Andrew Breitbart’s blog. Some security expert.
But Ryan didn’t just tip off the authorities. He was also giving information to companies as well. When protesters discussed demonstrating in front of morning shows like Today and Good Morning America, Ryan quickly forwarded the thread to Mark Farrell, the chief security officer at Comcast, the parent company of NBC Universal.
Ryan wrote:
Since you are the CSO, I am not sure of your role in NBC since COMCAST owns them.
There is a huge protest in New York call “Occupy Wall Street”. Here is an email of stunts that they will try to pull on the TODAY show.
We have been heavily monitoring Occupy Wall Street, and Anonymous.
“Thanks Tom,” Farrell responded. “I’ll pass this to my counterpart at NBCU.”
Did the FBI and/or NYPD ask him to monitor Occupy Wall Street? Was he just forwarding the emails on out of the goodness of his heart? In a phone interview with us, Ryan denied being an informant. “I do not work with the FBI,” he said.
Ryan said he knows Loyd through their mutual involvement in the Open Web Application Security Project, a non-profit computer security group of which Ryan is a board member. Ryan said he sent the emails to Loyd unsolicited simply because “everyone’s curious” about Occupy Wall Street, and he had a ground-eye view. “Jordan never asked me for anything.”
Was he sending every email he got to the authorities? Ryan said he couldn’t remember how many he’d passed on to the FBI or NYPD, or other third parties. Later he said that he only forwarded the two emails we noticed, detailed above.
But even if he’d been sending them on regularly, they were probably of limited use to the authorities. Most of the real organizing at Occupy Wall Street happens face-to-face, according to David Graeber, who was one of the earliest organizers. “We did some practical work on [the email list] at first—I think that’s where I first proposed the “we are the 99%” motto—but mainly it’s just an expressive forum,” he wrote in an email. “No one would seriously discuss a plan to do something covert or dangerous on such a list.”
But regardless of how many emails Ryan sent—or whether Loyd ever asked Ryan to spy on Occupy Wall Street—Loyd was almost certainly interested in the emails he received. Loyd has helped hunt down members of the hacktivist collective Anonymous, and he and his colleagues in the FBI’s cyber security squad have been monitoring their involvement in Occupy Wall Street.
At a New York cyber security conference one day before the protest began, Loyd cited Occupy Wall Street as an example of a “newly emerging threat to U.S. information systems.” (In the lead-up to Occupy Wall Street, Anonymous had issued threats against the New York Stock Exchange.) He told the assembled crowd the FBI has been “monitoring the event on cyberspace and are preparing to meet it with physical security,” according to a New York Institute of Technology press release.
We contacted Loyd to ask about his relationship with Ryan and if any of the information Ryan passed along was of any use to the agency. He declined to answer questions and referred us to the FBI’s press office. We’ll post an update if we hear back from them.
We asked Ryan again this morning about how closely he was working with the authorities. Again, he claimed it was only these two emails, which is unlikely given he forwarded them to the FBI and NYPD without providing any context or explaining where he’d gotten them.
And he detailed his rationale for assisting the NYPD:
My respect for FDNY & NYPD stems from them risking their lives to save mine when my house was on fire in sunset park when I was 8 yrs old. Also, for them risking their lives and saving many family and friends during 9/11.
Don’t you find it Ironic that out of all the NYPD involved with the protest, [protesters] have only targeted the ones with Black Ribbons, given to them for their bravery during 9/11?
I am sorry if we see things differently, I try to look at everything as a whole and in patterns. Everything we do in life and happens in life, there is a pattern behind it.
This is an exert from the movie The Great Dictator starring Charlie Chaplin. Statements made then, Should be held true today. Stand up and fight my brothers and sisters. Raise up your arm to those who oppress and Tyrannize.
You can not join Anonymous. Nobody can join Anonymous. Anonymous is not an organization. It is not a club, a party or even a movement. There is no charter, no manifest, no membership fees. Anonymous has no leaders, no gurus, no ideologists. In fact, it does not even have a fixed ideology.
All we are is people who travel a short distance together – much like commuters who meet in a bus or tram: For a brief period of time we have the same route, share a common goal, purpose or dislike. And on this journey together, we may well change the world.
Nobody can speak for Anonymous. Nobody could say: you are in, or you are out. Do you still want to join Anonymous? Well, you are in if you want to.
How to get in contact with others? Anonymous has no centralized infrastructure. We use existing facilities of the Internet, especially social networks, and we are ready to hop on to the next one if this one seems compromised, is under attack, or starts to bore us.
At the time of this writing, Facebook, Twitter and the IRC appear to host the most active congregations. But this may change at any time. Still, these are probably the best places to get started. Look for terms like “anonymous”, “anonops” and other keywords that might be connected to our activities.
How do I recognize other Anonymous? We come from all places of society: We are students, workers, clerks, unemployed; We are young or old, we wear smart clothes or rugs, we are hedonists, ascetics, joy riders or activists. We come from all races, countries and ethnicities. We are many.
We are your neighbours, your co-workers, your hairdressers, your bus drivers and your network administrators. We are the guy on the street with the suitcase and the girl in the bar you are trying to chat up. We are anonymous. Many of us like to wear Guy Fawkes masks on demonstrations. Some of us even show them in their profile pictures in social networks. That helps to recognize each other.
Have you been infiltrated? If you talk to another Anonymous, you will never know who he is. He may be a hacker, cracker, phisher, agent, spy, provocateur – or just the guy from next door. Or his daughter. It is not illegal to be Anonymous. Nor is it illegal to wear Guy Fawkes masks. Keep that in mind. If you personally have not been involved in illegal activities, you have nothing to worry, no matter whom you talk to; If you have, it is wise not to talk about it. To no one.
How do I protect my privacy? Invent an alias, a nick, a pseudonym … call it as you will, just invent something. Then register a mail account in that name with one of the big mail providers. Use this email address to register your Twitter, Facebook, etc. accounts. Make sure to clear all cookies before you start using your new identity, or better use a different web browser for Anonymous than for your other activities.
If you have higher needs for security, ask us about encryption, steganography, TOR, etc. Many of us know how to use them.We will always respect your need for privacy. We will never ask for your personal information. If we do, we will not expect a truthful answer; And neither should you.
What is the right thing to do? The only person who can tell you what is right for you is yourself. This is also the only person you should follow. We have no leaders. You are also the only person responsible for your actions. Do what you think is right. Do not what you think is wrong.
How many Anonymous are there?
We are more than you think. We are more than anybody thinks. We are many.
What is Coltan? Coltan is short for Columbite-tantalite – a black tar-like mineral found in major quantities in the Congo.. The Congo possesses 80 percent of the world’s coltan. When coltan is refined it becomes a heat resistant powder that can hold a high electric charge. The properties of refined coltan is a vital element in creating devices that store energy or capacitors, which are used in a vast array of small electronic devices, especially in mobile phones, laptop computers, pagers, and other electronic devices.
Who are the primary exploiters of Coltan in the Congo?
Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and their proxy militias are the primary exploiters of coltan in the Congo. In an 18 month period Rwanda made $250 million as a result of exploitation of coltan in the Congo. Although Rwanda and Uganda possess little or no coltan, during the period of the war in the Congo, their exports escalated exponentially. For example, Rwanda’s coltan export went from less than 50 tons in 1995 to almost 250 tons in 1998. Zero cassiterite was transported from the Congo to Uganda in 1998, however by 2000 151 drums were transported.
The United Nations notes in its 2001 report on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the congo that “The consequences of illegal exploitation has been twofold: (a)massive availability of financial resources for the Rwandan Patriotic Army, and the individual enrichment of top Ugandan military commanders and civilians; (b) the emergence of of illegal networks headed by either top military officers or businessmen.”
Foreign Corporate exploitation Although the countries mentioned above directly exploit coltan, foreign multi-national corporations have been deeply involved in the exploitation of coltan in the Congo. The coltan mined by rebels and foreign forces is sold to foreign corporations. Although, the United Nations in its reports on the Congo do not directly blame the multi-national corporations for the conflict in the Congo, the United Nations does say that these companies serve as “the engine of the conflict in the DRC.”
Major United States players include: Cabot Corporation, Boston, MA OM Group, Cleveland, Ohio AVX, Myrtle Beach, SC Eagle Wings Resources International, Ohio
Trinitech International, Ohio Kemet Electronics Corporation, Greenville, SC Vishay Sprague. Malvern, PA
Corporations from other countries have been a part of the coltan exploitation chain. These companies include but are not limited to Germany’s HC Starc and EPCOS, China’s Nigncxia, and Belgium’s George Forrest International.
Once the coltan is processed and converted to capacitors, it is then sold to companies such as Nokia, Motorola, Compaq, Alcatel, Dell, Hewlett-Packard , IBM, Lucent, Ericsson and Sony for use in a wide assortment of everyday products ranging from cell phones to computer chips and game consoles.
What are some of the uses of coltan in modern society?
• Laptop computers
• Cellular phones
• Jet engines
• Rockets
• Cutting tools
• Camera lenses
• X-ray film
• Ink jet printers
• Hearing aids
• Pacemakers
• Airbag protection systems
• Ignition and motor control modules, GPS, ABS systems in automobiles
• Game consoles such as playstation, xbox and nintendo
• Video cameras
• Digital still cameras
• Sputtering targets
• Chemical process equipment
• Cathodic protection systems for steel structures such as bridges, water tanks
• Prosthetic devices for humans – hips, plates in the skull, also mesh to repair bone removed after damage by cancer
• Suture clips
• Corrosion resistant fasteners, screws, nuts, bolts
• High temperature furnace parts.
• High temperature alloys for air and land based turbines
The components controlling the flow of electricity in mobile phones are composed of the refined mineral known as Coltan. With more and more people using mobile phones the demand for Coltan has increased significantly.
Mobile phones fuel Congo conflict
The largest reserves of Coltan are to be found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and much of the finance sustaining the civil wars in Africa, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is directly connected to Coltan profits. Coltan is extracted under terrible working conditions in mines in Eastern Congo.
The United Nations reports child labour in Africa has significantly increased in Coltan mines. In some regions of the Congo, about 30 percent of schoolchildren are now forced to work in the mines.
It can be dangerous to ask questions
“The control over these resources works through maintaining local militia and exploiting cheap labour to excavate the mines”, says Antony Grange, Country Coordinator with experience from the DanChurchAid work in DRC Congo. “Attempting to oppose these practices locally is very risky business, as DanChurchaid’s former partner “Héritiers de la Justice” knows all too well since they have experienced several assassination of their staff members in the recent years. Only international pressure may stop this development,” says Antony Grange.
International pressure is important
When Denmark become a member of the UN Security Council, the Danish Government put the actions to promote peace and stability in Africa on top of the agenda, and they promised to put a focus on the role natural recourses play as a cause to many conflicts. Income from oil, diamonds and export of woods, continues to fuel armed conflicts.
A call to action
However, Denmark has not managed to convince the Security Council to strengthen the present activities. Therefore the Danish development NGOs now call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to bring the issue to the table and to work for more efficient tools for the UN to punish those who make profit out of the conflict resources. The organisation also calls for a permanent position within the UN, with a mandate to work for prevention of conflicts financed by natural resources such as oil, woods, and minerals.
Bitcoins are not mere drug currency.
Bitcoins are not failing.
Okay?
Are we clear about that?
Good.
The future of online commerce looks to rely less and less on the physical amount of money you have in your bank accounts and wallets and more on what you could call “digital” wallets: online reservoirs where you store money. Really, we already use some variation of a digital wallet, we just don’t easily acknowledge it. You work, you get paid via direct deposit, numbers change in your checking account, you use debit and credit cards to make transactions, you go back to work. Rinse, repeat. You hardly ever see cash unless you deliberately withdraw it from an ATM. Anymore, our money consists of strings of number values running through some computer located who knows where. We just confidently assume that all that money is actually staying or going where it should be staying or going.
While that describes our current model of commerce, it also serves as a fair portrait of Bitcoins, the emerging currency exclusive to the Internet.
If you’re familiar with Bitcoins and run an online business, how do you feel about accepting this form of currency? Cash currency has never kept somebody from getting ripped off, so what is the main hesitation for you and your business when it comes to accepting an exclusively online currency? If you’re unsteady about it right now, what would you like to see change with Bitcoins (or any type of online currency) before you were more comfortable with using it? Or, are you totally onboard with this form of currency already? Share your thoughts with us and other readers below in the comments.
Essentially, Bitcoins are an intangible currency, really no different in action than the numbers bouncing up and down in your bank account. Alternately, instead of representing sums of physical currency, Bitcoins are literally a majestic sequence of unique numbers that can be traded for goods. Instead of swapping wads of bound fibers and inks that are woven together into this germy thing we call cash, Bitcoins exist in a purely digital tapestry. It’s an experiment in decentralized currency, and while it’s been a good experiment and still has some growing to do, it doesn’t show any signs of disappearing anytime soon.
While it’s still got some time to really appreciate and grow stronger as a currency, a purely online currency will exist in one form or another. It won’t ever replace your tangible currency, but work alongside it for all of your online consumer decisions.
To find out more about the current state of Bitcoins and what will happen with them in the near (and far) future, I got in touch with Gavin Andresen, the Lead Core Bitcoin Developer, about the developments of the past year regarding Bitcoins and why this novel currency could feature prominently in the future of online commerce.
Bitcoins: A Primer
Money as an object is meaningless. It’s paper and and some inks and, thanks to people, lots of bacteria. It’s an arbitrary token that merely represents a commercial promissory value people can earn in exchange for goods or services that can then either be saved or spent on other goods or services. Dollars, euros, yen, pounds, rupees, tobacco leaves, rands – it doesn’t matter what object you invest value into, it’s the idea behind the currency that buttresses its value. The Bitcoin is no different.
The only difference is that, as opposed to physical money that you’ll stuff into your pockets and wallets, you will likely never actually hold a Bitcoin (yes, there are physical versions of Bitcoins if you absolutely must have a real version to thumb around in your palms). Just because you’re likely to never touch one, though, doesn’t mean that Bitcoins are any less valuable than the bills you have folded up in your right pocket. Instead, think of it like this: you are no more likely to hold a Bitcoin in your hand than you are to hold Pythagoras’ theorem in your hand.
What does distinguish this disembodied currency from its corporeal familiars, however, is that Bitcoins are not dependent on anything except the people who produce and use it. No governments, no banks, no organizations – just people. A truly anarchistic, peer-to-peer currency.
For a simplified explanation for how the Bitcoin market works on a consumer level, have a look at this video put together by We Use Coins.
The currency, however, doesn’t just fall into your lap like a prize from a cereal box, nor is it just magically conjured up from the imagination like the latest Internet meme. The production of Bitcoins is best explained through the simile of gold mining. Instead of boring through a mountain to unearth precious metals, new Bitcoins are generated by unlocking a mathematical sequence called a block chain and are doled out in increments of 50. The people that produce these Bitcoins, then, are known as miners (that’s actually the technical term for Bitcoin producers, too, not just a metaphorical descriptor). These miners, however, have traded in their helmets and pickaxes in exchange for loads of GPU firepower and very sophisticated software capable of deciphering the block chains. The software works in tandem across a network to solve these cryptographic proofs and the miner who is the first to solve the block chain will receive the 50 Bitcoins. Once a block chain has been unlocked, it is added to a ledger in order to prevent those Bitcoins from double-spending.
Eventually, as more blocks are solved, fewer Bitcoins will be generated because the block chains will be worth fewer new coins. Solving a block chain today is worth 50 new Bitcoins, but as of this December that reward will be reduced to 25 Bitcoins. Some time off in the future, it will be reduced again to 12.5. The gradual reduction in rewards works to mitigate the generation of new Bitcoins so as to avoid flooding the market, which would result in a devalued currency.
As more miners work to generate Bitcoins, the difficulty in unlocking the block chains increases so as ensure that a new block is generated only every 10 minutes on average. The increased difficulty of unlocking a block chain’s sequence is designed in such a way that, over time, the maximum capacity of Bitcoins that will be generated will be 21 million. Added to the multiplied difficulty of solving subsequent block chains, more and more computer power is required, which some have said could be a deterrent for would-be miners from working on the more difficult block chains. Andresen disagrees with the argument that hardware needs are becoming preventive. “Mining Bitcoins is becoming increasingly energy efficient,” he says. “Bitcoin miners want to pay as little as they can for electricity, so they’re constantly working to make mining more efficient.”
Energy requirements wouldn’t really matter in the grand scheme of Bitcoin production anyways, Andresen explains, as the Bitcoin production process is smart enough to adjust for variations in the miner work force. “The Bitcoin system adjusts itself so that the target number of Bitcoins are created about every 10 minutes, no matter how many miners there are.”
He adds, “The number of Bitcoin miners has almost nothing to do with how quickly Bitcoin transactions are processed, so it doesn’t matter to the Bitcoin system how much energy or how many miners are working – as long as there is one, the system will work.”
The production of Bitcoins isn’t infinite, though. In fact, there is a fixed amount that will ever be produced: 21 million. Although that peak Bitcoin mark isn’t expected to be reached until 2140, the number of Bitcoins generated will begin to taper off toward zero well before that, at which point miners will then be compensated with Bitcoin transaction fees. As the generation of Bitcoins decreases over time, the cost of a transaction using Bitcoins will increase, which these blocks exist to verify. In lieu of transaction fees, though, Andresen postulates that miners could also be compensated by a “more complicated arrangement between merchants that want their transactions confirmed quickly and securely.” One way or another, though, the monetary reward for generating Bitcoins will always be present.
As of this year, over 8 million Bitcoins have been generated. The first block of Bitcoins to be unlocked was completed by Satoshi Nakamoto, who could be considered the progenitor of Bitcoins. As Wired Magazine’s Benjamin Wallace covered extensively in a piece about bitcoins last year, Nakamoto might be best understood as the Tyler Durden of the Bitcoin culture. An effluvium of mystery envelopes Nakamoto as no one is certain of who he is or where he came from or, most intriguing, where he disappeared to following his last public communication near the end of 2010. It’s rumored the name was a pseudonym or that Nakamoto was actually a collective of developers. It’s even been suggested that Nakamoto was a nom de guerre for assorted bodies of the United States government. Nobody knows, and every major player in the Bitcoin industry denies being Nakamoto.
At this point, though, as the Bitcoin system is beginning to become more stabilized and the project is on the cusp of transcending any one person, does the origin of Bitcoins really matter anymore? It’s been around long enough to confidently assess that dealing in Bitcoins is likely not some kind of Faustian gamble. Besides, one of the prominent features of Bitcoins is its near-anonymity of the users who deal with it, a quality celebrated by Bitcoin proponents. If the currency users are mostly anonymous, why then shouldn’t the progenitor of Bitcoins be anonymous, too? If the shoe fits, right? We could all be Nakamoto and none of us would be Nakamoto. To obsess over the origin of Bitcoins threatens to belie the hard work that the currency’s current legion of developers are doing in order to bolster Bitcoins into a formidable, viable option for online commerce.
The Problem With Bitcoins
The Bitcoin has had a tumultuous twelve months. Perhaps its biggest mainstream debut to date happened in June 2011 when Gawker’s Adrian Chen published a piece about the underbelly of the Internet, the Silk Road, where you can buy, among other things, any fashion of drugs (drugs I didn’t even think existed anymore) one desires. Because of the anonymity that accompanies the use of Bitcoins, the Silk Road trades exclusively in the currency. As Gawker’s story was many people’s introduction to Bitcoins, the piece carelessly marginalized it as The Currency for underground drug trafficking on the Internet.
Regardless of Gawker’s oversights, Bitcoins blew up. The value of Bitcoins skyrocketed after Chen’s piece began to circulate and inspire interest in legions of new potential customers of Silk Road. Consequently, Senator Chuck Schumer called for a federal investigation into the Silk Roadin order to hopefully shut it down. Now that the Bitcoin market had attracted the attention of the United States government, the popularity of the currency continued skyward.
The boom was short-lived, though, as it was not an organic and sustainable growth. It was an artificial trend born from a sudden onslaught of sensational media attention that ballooned the value of the currency. Being at the mercy of the public’s caprice, though, the value of Bitcoins crashed back to Earth a month later. By August, it had returned to its pre-Gawker levels.
Five months after the Gawker piece, Wired was preparing the toe-tags for Bitcoins, citing the currency’s sustainability problems and increasing lack of interest in the continued production of Bitcoins.
Andresen concurs that Bitcoins were pushed out onto the main stage long before the system was ready to handle that kind of attention. “We had a press avalanche last year,” he says, “Where the first couple of mainstream articles about Bitcoin caught the attention of other reporters, who in turn also wrote about it, which then triggered even more press.”
He continues, “That was both great and terrible for the project: great because it drew a lot more technical and business talent to look at Bitcoin and start Bitcoin-related projects, but terrible because when people realized that Bitcoin still has a lot of growing up to do, the speculative bubble popped.”
It’s misleading to say that Bitcoins failed because of that popped bubble. True, investing in Bitcoins currently isn’t as profitable as it was for a brief period last year, but that kind of inflation was artificially generated and really should never have happened in the first place. More, it’s probably not the last time the Bitcoin will encounter some heavy turbulence. “I think it is very likely the same thing will happen again sometime in the next few years as other parts of the world discover Bitcoin or it is re-discovered in Europe and the U.S.,” Andresen says. “I expect the wild price fluctuations to diminish over time as Bitcoin infrastructure grows up and speculators start to get a better idea of the real value of Bitcoin.”
That’s Money 101 for you, though: the potent volatility of supply and demand working upon, for better or worse, the unpredictable engines of human interest. Adding to the uncertainty is the fact that, most obviously, people already have a form (if not multiple forms) of currency, which has likely created an erroneous impression for the laity that Bitcoins are a second-class currency.
Then again, Bitcoins were never really intended to launch like an unstoppable money-missile into the future. Nakamoto, Andresen, and other Bitcoin developers have always cautioned investors that Bitcoins should at best be considered an experiment. “I tell people to only invest time or money in Bitcoin that they can afford to lose,” Andresen says. “There are a lot of things that could possibly derail it, ranging from some fundamental flaw in the algorithm that everybody has missed (he doesn’t see this as a likely possibility at this point) to world-wide government regulation (also unlikely, he says) to some alternative rising up and replacing Bitcoin.”
In a way, the story thus far of Bitcoins as an unpredictable investment is the quintessential story of the Internet as a whole. Every prominent company that currently claims a seat among the pantheon of technology giants – Apple, Google, Facebook, Twitter, IBM, et al. – has come into that position due to the rise and fall of previous online ventures. The lessons gleaned from the decline of previous companies like the Myspaces and Friendsters and Lycos is likely the only reason the current generation of tech leaders have managed to prevail for so long. In the end, the diminished presence of these companies is less a woeful tale of failure and more a triumphant testament to how resilient and efficient the evolution of ideas has been on the Internet, especially in such a short amount of time.
With Bitcoins, it remains to be seen if it will eventually be minted as a mainstay in online culture or merely serve as an early milestone in the continuing evolution of online currency. Andresen is optimistic, though, that Bitcoins are here to stay even in light of competing online currencies possibly popping up in the future. “I think to overcome Bitcoin’s head-start, an alternative will either have to have a large company or government backing it and marketing it. Or else, it will have to be radically better in some way,” he says.
“There seems to be a perception that Bitcoin is in a winner-take-all race against other currencies; either everybody in the world will be using it for all of their online purchases in 50 years or it will not exist. I think the online payment world will like our current world of currencies – different currencies used in different places. The online payments won’t be divided by geography, though it might be divided by language or culture or social network.”
As it were, the currency network’s public image may have taken a bruising last year, but the reports of Bitcoin’s demise appear to have been exaggerated.
The Currency of the Future?
For now, the Bitcoin experiment appears to have weathered the Great Media Blitzkrieg of 2011. Bitcoins’ value is once again growing at the organic rate it was intended to grow at. So… to 2140 and beyond, right?
“I’m not even going to try to predict what will happen in the year 2140,” Andresen is quick to say. His focus is more attuned to the more immediate future of Bitcoins. “In December of this year, the Bitcoin will be 4 years old and the number of new Bitcoins produced will be cut in half. I think we will learn a lot when that happens and that will give some insight into what will happen over the years as Bitcoin production slowly drops to zero.”
Like any model of currency, it’d be a risk to really put all of your eggs into the Bitcoins basket. The currency could have long-term staying power. Then again, it could exist as a prototype that ends up producing a more advanced model of online currency and eventually be supplanted by something like a Bitcoin 2.0, for lack of a better term. Either way, some version of Bitcoin will continue to grow and become a part of our future experience with online commerce.
“I think there will eventually be one dominant currency that is used for 80% of worldwide online transactions,” Andresen predicts, “but I think there will always be alternatives. The most likely outcome in my lifetime, the next 40 years or so, is most people will use their national currencies when purchasing goods and services from other people in their own countries but will use something else for international payments.”
Naturally, as Bitcoins continue to evolve, developers like Andresen are working hard at ensuring the private security of Bitcoin users. Andresen says his past six months have been spent building “multi-signature transactions” for the Bitcoin network. He explains the multi-signature security feature as thus: “They are kind of like if you took all of the paper money in your wallet and then tore it in half and put half in your safe deposit box and kept the other half in your house. A robber would have to break into both your house and your safe deposit box to steal your money.”
You’d be hard pressed to find that kind of security with your current stash of cash if for nothing else but because it would be ungodly inconvenient for the consumer, to say nothing of the ambitious thief. Andresen says that’s one of the major advantages Bitcoins will have over our current terrestrial currency: you can conjunctively store your Bitcoins in two places at once so that in order to use them, a person would need access to both storage sites. One location where you might store your Bitcoins could be a secure website run by a bank which acts as the proverbial safe deposit box for Bitcoins whereas the other could be your computer or smartphone.
“To steal your Bitcoins, thieves would have to break into both your computer or smartphone andyour bank. And, it would be impossible for anybody at the bank to steal them without first breaking into your computer.”
The infrastructure for this multi-signature security technology is still in production, he says, but he expects that by the end of this year “there will be easy-to-use, incredibly secure and convenient solutions for storing and spending Bitcoins.”
With that kind of unprecedented level of security, it’s even possible that in the future Bitcoins might become a wise means for stashing your savings.
While the security advances will likely be a strong draw for future Bitcoin investors, perhaps of equal importance to the gradual growth of Bitcoins will be its acceptance as a form of payment with more online businesses, but that’s all in due time. As the reliability and legitimacy of Bitcoins is developed over time, don’t be surprised to see more online businesses begin accepting it. For now, though, the goal is to nurse the Bitcoin economy to a level where it will persevere the next blizzard of media attention the developers anticipate in the coming years. It’s possible Bitcoins may endure another “rise-and-fall” inflation in the future, but hopefully it won’t so easily shake the faith of the masses, at least as badly as last year’s roller coaster appears to have done.
In the meantime and in-between time, reconsider what those figures in your bank account really mean to you. You might see dollars or whatever your country’s currency happens to be, but the reality is that what you’re using these days intrinsically isn’t so far removed from Bitcoins. The Bitcoin experiment may or may not survive to 2140 but even if the Bitcoin itself were to disappear, the very idea of it is powerful enough that the development of an online currency will undoubtedly continue.
A few thoughts on the “hacktivist” group Anonymous that came out of Josh Corman and Brian “Jericho” Martin’s keynote at theSOURCE security conference in Boston last week:
Hacktivist is a sloppy term. A small percentage of those who claim affiliation with the ideology, or movement, or brand, or whatever we wind up calling it, are hackers or activists (5 to 10 percent are skilled hackers or activists, while the lowest common denominators “don’t do much” and are “glorified cheerleaders, at best”, they said).
We need a better, more efficient Anonymous.
Before we explore their rationale for Anonymous 2.0, it’s worthwhile to know why Corman – director of Security Intelligence for Akamai – and Jericho – a “hacker turned security mouthpiece” – care, and why they think we all should.
Here’s how Jericho explained it:
"Most problems on the Internet don't affect us. With Anonymous—and we're using Anonymous as an example for this presentation, but it could be anybody: Anonymous or a splinter group [such as LulzSec] or the next [group] that comes along—almost everyone is involved. Vigilantes, 'good guys,' analysts ... with civilians stuck in the middle. Those whose information is doxed, those people are getting affected more than anyone. If you're affected, you're involved. … Look at [Anonymous's] influence. From analysts, to law enforcement, to former members, to the media, to organized crime, to foreign nation states. "
Nobody in technology, nor in business, for that matter, can get away from fighting Anonymous or other similar groups, whether the fight transpires in media or anywhere else, he said.
So that’s why they care, and why we must. Beyond our own, personal involvement, a broader concern is that much of what we lay at the Anonymous doorstep may be branded as such merely as a smokescreen.
As Corman noted, this amorphous thing we call “Anonymous” has become the perfect scape goat. Anonymous members continually drop in and out of affiliation with, or actions taken on behalf of, the group.
Any attack can be labelled with the Anonymous brand, regardless of whether it was sincerely done under activist principles or is simply branded that way to cover the tracks of, say, a nation state (sound familiar? “Suspicious attack. Must be China!”).
For all the mayhem they’ve caused, much of what “Anonymous” has “done” (I use quotes because there’s often [usually?] no way to determine actual perpetrators) is to simply exploit low-hanging fruit, Jericho said, thus erecting worthwhile signposts to cyber security flaws.
As Corman put it:
"Anonymous has held up a mirror to our defects. [They've done] nothing really hard. They've just showed us how insecure we are [with regards to] basic Internet hygiene. If they turned up the heat, it would be even worse."
In a nutshell, if we can’t deal with the worst the Anonymous-affiliated have to offer, “we’re f*cked,” Jericho said. If that word offends you, “you have to get out of the industry,” because sooner or later, in one fashion or another, you’ll likely have to deal with Anonymous.
Which leads to why we we should wish for, or even need, a better, more efficient Anonymous.
As it is, Jericho said, Anonymous are “a crude, blunt weapon”. Why not a better Anonymous? One that’s more efficient and that gets stuff done with less collateral damage? One that doesn’t dox the personal information of innocent people and put them and their families at risk?
The steps for creating what they call a “a straw man of ‘organized chaos'”:
Statement of belief, values, objectives, and first principles – i.e. WHY you have come together
Code of conduct and operational parameters – i.e. HOW you conduct your pursuit of your common goals
A plan for streamlining success, increasing potency, and mitigating risks – i.e. WHAT will make you more successful
Would such codification cause the group to splinter? Hopefully. The group needs to specialize, Corman and Jericho said. An Anonymous splinter devoted to free-speech issues would be a boon if it could devote itself to the task at hand, for example.
Does Anonymous agree with the proposals? Anonymous has no unified voice, the keynoters said, so it’s a moot question — it is, after all, a composite, rather than a singular, monolithic group, and there are any number of levels of allegiance and reasons for participating.
But some regular actors in the movement have agreed with the tenets – one plus of a codified Anonymous is the ability to disavow a given action that goes against the stated objectives of the group.
Jericho pointed to the recently announced MalSec (Malicious Security) group as an example of how new splinter groups might codify their beliefs. From their YouTube video:
"For many years we have watched as more unconstitutional laws are proposed and passed and as censorship, disinformation, and corruption have become the norm."
"In an attempt to bring these acts to a halt, we are targeting the very people that have attempted to do us harm. We do, however, fervently believe in free speech. Everyone should be able to express themselves freely, even if others disapprove. As such, we have decided never to remove the original data, when a website of an enemy is defaced."
That’s a start. That’s a statement of a belief – free speech – and a practice – refraining from removing original data. Thus the group can disavow fraudulently labelled MalSec actions.
Now, regarding the term hacktivist: I’ve used it. Lots of journalists have used it. I’m not going to use it anymore.
When Corman and Jericho polled the audience to ask how many thought that the law was winning in its fight against Anonymous, only one hand went up.
That only shows that Anonymous has won the media, Jericho said, whereas the law has failed to engage our attention.
The keynoters’ research has shown that some 184 Anonymous actors have been arrested and charged in 14 countries. Only one in three Anonymous-branded actions make the news, one in five make the news on tech sites, and only one in 30 make the mainstream news.
These are guestimates. The point is, law enforcement is making busts. They need to rattle their sabers more, and we journalists need to pay attention.
We also need a better term than hacktivist, which embodies the romantic type of Robin Hood image that Hollywood, journalists and the public adore.
“The Anonymous affiliated” is kludgy. But perhaps we won’t be able to come up with a better term until Anonymous itself draws its boundaries, making it possible for a given action to be rightfully branded or justifiably disavowed.
If you can think of a better term to use in the meantime, please share it in the comments section.
And kudos to Corman and Jericho for opening up such a thoughtful discussion about a topic that’s too easily simplified and romanticized.
From the very first release of ‘AntiSec’ related hashtags, Anonymous king-pin Sabu was under full control of the FBI. It is clear this was a red-herring to help promote the cyber-surveillance police state currently undergoing rapid deployment.
We are Anonymous, and we do not forgive. Forgiveness requires humility, humility requires dignity. We have neither.
We are void of human restraints, such as self respect and common sense.
All those who break this pact will be eliminated without hesitation. And by elimination we will put their name on an icky photo and shit in each others’ mouths.
Those who perform reckless actions or wish to harm the Anonymous will be eliminated without hesitation. Again, elimination is our word for doing very little about it.
Failure is the basis of our existence.
Enemies of the Anonymous include anyone who can point out how many times we contradict ourselves in a single sentence.
Our enemies are to be flaccidly made fun of, using the same tired photoshopped stuff stolen from someone else.
Anonymous must “work” as one. No Anonymous knows anything.
Betrayal of Anonymous is both ironic and appropriate.
Manipulation of the weak and innocent is something that the truly weak believe indicates power, as such we do it alot. Not well but, often. Once a victim is no longer commodious, they are to be eliminated. Also, the cow was slaughtered in the abattoir.
REPRODUCE. REPRODUCE. REPRODUCE. Like cockroaches and Catholics we need to make sure our stupidity is at least backed by numbers. Quantity over quality. Loud = Funny.
No man-made or natural occurance can harm the Anonymous. Except when Mom and Dad ground us from the computer. That’s pouting time.
Under no circumstances are Anonymous human. We are beneath humans and mortality.
Anonymous are not to partake in meaningless tasks….pffft Ahhh dude I’m totally shitting ya, that’s all we do.
You are legion, for we are many. That makes it easier to defend ourselves when smart people tell us to stop acting like idiots.
Anonymous is everywhere at all times, we like to loiter. we really have nothing better to do than hang out. Yet, singular Anonymous are not permitted to know everything. Which is good, because we know very little.
All have the potential to be Anonymous until they choose to drop a bag of fertilizer on their nutsack and grow a pair. Those who are not Anonymous are to be eliminated….or photoshopped into a nasty photo which ever one requires less standing and walking. Or hack a paypal account and charge PS3’s, send massive amounts of cowardly and empty death threats or, whatever weak ass “criminal” act we think will make us appear powerful.
Anonymous has no weakness or flaw. Well, except maybe getting laid. That ain’t happening. And a whole bunch of others. But besides crippling personality flaws, body odor, lack of humor, not getting laid and relying on shock value and memes to speak for us…we have only a few more flaws and weaknesses.
Laws of Nature and Man cannot restrain the Anonymous. However, an IP ban, power outage or, a light punch to the solar plexus can drop us like a bag of bad habits.
Anonymous is Zero. Feuding and argument amongst the Anonymous is both constant and unavoidable.
Anonymous is in control at all times. We just choose to waste all of it.
Anonymous has no identity. Those who are not Anonymous yet know our presence must be eliminated. Again and, I can not stress this enough people, “eliminate” means sitting on our asses all day pretending to jerk off to Goatse, while our mothers yell at us to get jobs.
Anonymous cannot be contained by mere restraints. We are far too fat to fit any normal conveyance, handcuffs or standard size airline seats.
Anonymous are all equally stupid. No one is more retarded then Anonymous.
Anonymous must obey the Code. Those who do not are to be raped with our mighty e-peens, until supper time and homework, then an hour of Gameboy before bedtime.
Anonymous worships nothing because anonymous is nothing.
Anonymous cares for nothing, but Anonymous. Our existence is vapid, myopic and limited.
Humanity is the virus; Anonymous is the open wound that invites it in.
UPDATE: The developer of a leading open source application for encrypted online chat, Nadim Kobeissi, claims to have been detained and interrogated at the US-Canadian border yesterday. “Out of my 4 DHS interrogations in the past 3 weeks, it’s the first time I’m asked about Cryptocat crypto and my passport is confiscated,” tweets Kobeissi. The US interrogator also asked about which encryption algorithms Cryptocat deployed and they were curious about its level of censorship resistance.
According to the ACLU, the border interrogation about Kobeissi’s encryption program raises troubling questions about the government’s claimed powers at the border. The “SSSS” designation stands for Secondary Security Screening Selection and if selected you become subject to extensive searches and interrogations — for any reason whatsoever. Ironically, since overall awareness about the existence of the Cryptocat program has increased, perhaps this unfortunate detention at the US border has done some good after all.
Nadim Kobeissi, master hacker, summoned for interrogation multiple times as a teenager by cyber-intelligence authorities in Beirut, Lebanon, sat in the backyard of a restaurant in Brooklyn, astounded that he was being treated to lunch.
“Please,” he protested, “you shouldn’t pay for my omelet.”
Mr. Kobeissi, 21, now a college student in Montreal, spent the weekend in New York City with elders of his tribe, software code writers who have ambitions that do not involve making suitcases of money off clever applications for sharing photographs online.
This group was building a project called Cryptocat, which has a simple, countercultural goal: people should be able to talk on the Internet without being subjected to commercial or government surveillance.
“The whole point of Cryptocat is that you click a link and you’re chatting with someone over an encrypted chat room,” said Mr. Kobeissi, who was born in Lebanon and said he had lived through four wars. “That’s it. You’re done. It’s just as easy to use as Facebook chat, Google chat, anything.”
The Arab Spring showed that the power of the Internet and Web communications is a multi-edged blade, with activists able to organize through social media and to get their stories out, and authoritarian governments often able to target the activists by following the trail of digital crumbs.
Among the conspicuous sources of information are the chat transcripts often kept on commercial servers, making it easy to see who was talking, what they talked about, and when the conversations took place. Cryptocat and a few other services disguise the content of chat messages so that they look like gibberish to anyone who does not have the encryption key. There is nothing new about encryption technology, but it is a brain-breaking subject, and the tools for using it are tricky.
Mr. Kobeissi started building Cryptocat a year ago in his bedroom with the goal of making it simple to encrypt an online conversation. He had help last weekend from the Guardian Project, a group of developers who are trying to make mobile phones secure. They figured out a way to encrypt a chat on an Android phone by shaking it, taking advantage of the motion detectors in many smartphones. This will generate the digits that are part of the encryption process.
“You can dance with your phone to encrypt it,” Mr. Kobeissi said.
Up to 10 people can speak privately to one another at a time in a Cryptocat chat room, a feature that distinguishes it from other encryption chat services. It is not ready for use by people in life-and-death situations, Mr. Kobeissi said, but it can give people a place to avoid everyday monitoring of routine conversation.
“Cryptocat is an enabling, positive technology, and it’s an alternative,” said Jacob Appelbaum, a developer with the Tor project, which routes Web traffic in ways that help disguise sites that people have visited. “A key thing here is that it is an experiment, with valid criticisms. It’s not perfect. But it is important that we have people who are interested and knowledgeable about computer security who are working on these things, not just for money, and not just to break into people’s computers.”
The group met over the weekend at a code-a-thon organized by Julia Angwin of The Wall Street Journal, which has chronicled the spread of commercial surveillance in everyday technology in a vital series of articles and engaging online demonstrations called What They Know. A recent article in Wired magazine detailed big advances in United States government surveillance capabilities. Mr. Appelbaum and a documentary filmmaker, Laura Poitras, are holding a teach-in Friday evening at the Whitney Museum of American Art on the subject of surveillance.
The invention of powerful tools to thwart the commercial and governmental collection of personal data has been criticized as creating hiding places for terrorists and online sexual predators. Mr. Kobeissi said he had been startled by those complaints. “Evil people have been evil forever,” he said. “I don’t think they’re going to stop being evil or become more evil because of Cryptocat.”
He appears to be wide open and unguarded about himself.
“I love it when people criticize me,” he said, pausing for a second and then amending his words. “When they criticize me technically.”
His ambitions with Cryptocat are not financial, though he is trying to raise $2,000 to cover his costs for the next year. “Money is great, money is amazing,” he said. “It’s not like money is something I don’t understand. I understand what it is. I care more about making something nice that people can use, and it’s free and it makes a difference.”
Bitcoin is not inherently anonymous. It may be possible to conduct transactions is such a way so as to obscure your identity, but, in many cases, users and their transactions can be identified. We have performed an analysis of anonymity in the Bitcoin system and published our results in a preprint on arXiv.
The Full Story
Anonymity is not a prominent design goal of Bitcoin. However, Bitcoin is often referred to as being anonymous. We have performed a passive analysis of anonymity in the Bitcoin system using publicly available data and tools from network analysis. The results show that the actions of many users are far from anonymous. We note that several centralized services, e.g. exchanges, mixers and wallet services, have access to even more information should they wish to piece together users’ activity. We also point out that an active analysis, using say marked Bitcoins and collaborating users, could reveal even more details. The technical details are contained in a preprint on arXiv. We welcome any feedback or corrections regarding the paper.
Case Study: The Bitcoin Theft
To illustrate our findings, we have chosen a case study involving a user who has many reasons to stay anonymous. He is the alleged thief of 25,000 Bitcoins. This is a summary of the victim’s postings to the Bitcoin forums and an analysis of the relevant transactions.
We consider the user network of the thief. Each vertex represents a user and each directed edge between a source and a target represents a flow of Bitcoins from a public-key belonging to the user corresponding to the source to a public-key belonging to the user corresponding to the target. Each directed edge is colored by its source vertex. The network is imperfect in the sense that there is, at the moment, a one-to-one mapping between users and public-keys. We restrict ourselves to the egocentric network surrounding the thief: we include every vertex that is reachable by a path of length at most two ignoring directionality and all edges induced by these vertices. We also remove all loops, multiple edges and edges that are not contained in some biconnected component to avoid clutter. In Fig. 1, the red vertex represents the thief and the green vertex represents the victim. The theft is the green edge joining the victim and the thief. There are in fact two green edges located nearby in Fig. 1 but only one directly connects the victim to the thief.
Fig. 2: An interesting sub-network induced by the thief, the victim and three other vertices.
Interestingly, the victim and the thief are joined by paths (ignoring directionality) other than the green edge representing the theft. For example, consider the sub-network shown in Fig. 2 induced by the red, green, purple, yellow and orange vertices. This sub-network is a cycle. We contract all vertices whose corresponding public-keys belong to the same user. This allows us to attach values in Bitcoins and timestamps to the directed edges. Firstly, we note that the theft of 25,000 BTC was preceded by a smaller theft of 1 BTC. This was later reported by the victim in the Bitcoin forums. Secondly, using off-network data, we have identified some of the other colored vertices: the purple vertex represents the main Slush pool account and the orange vertex represents the computer hacker group LulzSec (see, for example, their Twitter stream). We note that there has been at least one attempt to associate the thief with LulzSec. This was a fake; it was created after the theft. However, the identification of the orange vertex with LulzSec is genuine and was established before the theft. We observe that the thief sent 0.31337 BTC to LulzSec shortly after the theft but we cannot otherwise associate him with the group. The main Slush pool account sent a total of 441.83 BTC to the victim over a 70-day period. It also sent a total of 0.2 BTC to the yellow vertex over a 2-day period. One day before the theft, the yellow vertex also sent 0.120607 BTC to LulzSec. Theyellow vertex represents a user who is the owner of at least five public-keys:
Like the victim, he is a member of the Slush pool, and like the thief, he is a one-time donator toLulzSec. This donation, the day before the theft, is his last known activity using these public-keys.
A Flow and Temporal Analysis
In addition to visualizing the egocentric network of the thief with a fixed radius, we can follow significant flows of value through the network over time. If a vertex representing a user receives a large volume of Bitcoins relative to their estimated balance, and, shortly after, transfers a significant proportion of those Bitcoins to another user, we deem this interesting. We built a special purpose tool that, starting with a chosen vertex or set of vertices, traces significant flows of Bitcoins over time. In practice we have found this tool to be quite revealing when analyzing the user network.
Fig. 3: A visualization of Bitcoin flow from the theft. The size of a vertex corresponds to its degree in the entire network. The color denotes the volume of Bitcoins — warmer colors have larger volumes flowing through them. We also provide an SVG which contains hyperlinks to the relevant Block Explorer pages.
Fig. 4: An annotated version of Fig. 3.
In the left inset, we can see that the Bitcoins are shuffled between a small number of accounts and then transferred back to the initial account. After this shuffling step, we have identified four significant outflows of Bitcoins that began at 19:49, 20:01, 20:13 and 20:55. Of particular interest are the outflows that began at 20:55 (labeled as 1 in both insets) and 20:13 (labeled as 2 in both insets). These outflows pass through several subsequent accounts over a period of several hours. Flow 1 splits at the vertex labeled A in the right inset at 04:05 the day after the theft. Some of its Bitcoins rejoin Flow 2 at the vertex labeled B. This new combined flow is labeled as 3 in the right inset. The remaining Bitcoins from Flow 1 pass through several additional vertices in the next two days. This flow is labeled as 4 in the right inset.
A surprising event occurs on 16/06/2011 at approximately 13:37. A small number of Bitcoins are transferred from Flow 3 to a heretofore unseen public-key 1FKFiCYJSFqxT3zkZntHjfU47SvAzauZXN. Approximately seven minutes later, a small number of Bitcoins are transferred from Flow 3 to another heretofore unseen public-key 1FhYawPhWDvkZCJVBrDfQoo2qC3EuKtb94. Finally, there are two simultaneous transfers from Flow 4 to two more heretofore unseen public-keys:1MJZZmmSrQZ9NzeQt3hYP76oFC5dWAf2nD and 12dJo17jcR78Uk1Ak5wfgyXtciU62MzcEc. We have determined that these four public-keys — which receive Bitcoins from two separate flows that split from each other two days previously — are all contracted to the same user in our ancillary network. This user is represented as C.
There are several other examples of interesting flow. The flow labeled as Y involves the movement of Bitcoins through thirty unique public-keys in a very short period of time. At each step, a small number of Bitcoins (typically 30 BTC which had a market value of approximately US$500 at the time of the transactions) are siphoned off. The public-keys that receive the small number of Bitcoins are typically represented by small blue vertices due to their low volume and degree. On 20/06/2011 at 12:35, each of these public-keys makes a transfer to a public-key operated by the MyBitcoin service. Curiously, this public-key was previously involved in another separate Bitcoin theft.WikiLeaksWikiLeaks recently advised its Twitter followers that it now accepts anonymous donations via Bitcoin. They also state that “Bitcoin is a secure and anonymous digital currency. Bitcoins cannot be easily tracked back to you, and are a [sic] safer and faster alternative to other donation methods.” They proceed to describe a more secure method of donating Bitcoins that involves the generation of a one-time public-key but the implications for those who donate using the tweeted public-key are unclear. Is it possible to associate a donation with other Bitcoin transactions performed by the same user or perhaps identify them using external information?
Fig. 5: A visualization of the egocentric user network of WikiLeaks. We can identify many of the users in this visualization.
Our tools resolve several of the users with identifying information gathered from the Bitcoin Forums, the Bitcoin Faucet, Twitter streams, etc. These users can be linked either directly or indirectly to their donations. The presence of a Bitcoin mining pool (a large red vertex) and a number of public-keys between it and WikiLeaks’ public-key is interesting. Our point is that, by default, a donation to WikiLeaks’ ‘public’ public-key may not be anonymous.
Conclusion
This is a straight-forward passive analysis of public data that allows us to de-anonymize considerable portions of the Bitcoin network. We can use tools from network analysis to visualize egocentric networks and to follow the flow of Bitcoins. This can help us identify several centralized services that may have even more details about interesting users. We can also apply techniques such as community finding, block modeling, network flow algorithms, etc. to better understand the network.
Feedback
We are excited about the Bitcoin project and consider it a remarkable milestone in the evolution of electronic currencies. Our motivation for this work has not been to de-anonymize any individual users; rather it is to illustrate the limits of anonymity in the Bitcoin system. It is important that users do not have a false expectation of anonymity. We welcome any feedback or comments regarding the preprint on arXiv or the details in this post.
Over the past year, the U.S. government has begun to think of Anonymous, the online network phenomenon, as a threat to national security. According to The Wall Street Journal, Keith Alexander, the general in charge of the U.S. Cyber Command and the director of the National Security Agency, warned earlier this year that “the hacking group Anonymous could have the ability within the next year or two to bring about a limited power outage through a cyberattack.” His disclosure followed the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s release of several bulletins over the course of 2011 warning about Anonymous. Media coverage has often similarly framed Anonymous as a threat, likening it to a terrorist organization. Articles regularly refer to the Anonymous offshoot LulzSec as a “splinter group,” and a recent Fox News report uncritically quoted an FBI source lauding a series of arrests that would “[chop] off the head of LulzSec.”
This is the wrong approach. Seeing Anonymous primarily as a cybersecurity threat is like analyzing the breadth of the antiwar movement and 1960s counterculture by focusing only on the Weathermen. Anonymous is not an organization. It is an idea, a zeitgeist, coupled with a set of social and technical practices. Diffuse and leaderless, its driving force is “lulz” — irreverence, playfulness, and spectacle. It is also a protest movement, inspiring action both on and off the Internet, that seeks to contest the abuse of power by governments and corporations and promote transparency in politics and business. Just as the antiwar movement had its bomb-throwing radicals, online hacktivists organizing under the banner of Anonymous sometimes cross the boundaries of legitimate protest. But a fearful overreaction to Anonymous poses a greater threat to freedom of expression, creativity, and innovation than any threat posed by the disruptions themselves.
Hackers inserted a prank article on the PBS Web site declaring that the deceased rapper Tupac Shakur was “alive and well” in New Zealand.
No single image better captured the way that Anonymous has come to signify the Internet’s irreverent democratic culture than when, in the middle of a Polish parliamentary session in February 2012, well-dressed legislators donned Guy Fawkes masks — Anonymous’ symbol — to protest their government’s plan to sign the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). The treaty, designed to expand intellectual-property protection, involved years of negotiation among the United States, Japan, and the European Union, which are all like-minded on copyright law. It had the support of well-organized and well-funded companies, particularly in Hollywood and the recording industry. Although originally negotiated in secret, its contents were exposed by WikiLeaks in 2008. As a result, public pressure caused the treaty’s negotiators to water down many of its controversial provisions. But the final version still mimicked the least balanced aspects of U.S. copyright law, including its aggressive approach to asset seizure and damages. And so a last-minute protest campaign across Europe, using the symbolism of Anonymous, set out to stop the agreement from coming into force. So far, it has succeeded; no signatory has ratified it.
That is power — a species of soft power that allows millions of people, often in different countries, each of whom is individually weak, to surge in opposition to a given program or project enough to shape the outcome. In this sense, Anonymous has become a potent symbol of popular dissatisfaction with the concentration of political and corporate power in fewer and fewer hands.
It is only in this context of protest that one can begin to assess Anonymous’ hacking actions on the Internet. Over the last several years, the list of Anonymous’ cyber targets has expanded from more-or-less random Web sites, chosen for humor’s sake, to those with political or social meaning. In 2010, Anonymous activists launched a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack — an action that prevents access to a Web site for several hours — against Web sites of the Motion Picture Association of America and the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, the major trade groups for the film and music industries. The action came in response to revelations that several Indian movie studios had used an Indian company called Aiplex to mount vigilante DDoS attacks against illegal file-sharing sites.
War Zone – Soldiers With No Name [Commander X interview]
Language: Greek | Interviews: English
On March 2012 War Zone covered the Anonymous story interviewing Commander X via Skype.
SOLDIERS WITH NO NAME: Activists or internet rebels? Pranksters, common hackers or contemporary revolutionaries with keyboards and flat-screens? For the first time on Greek television, the people behind the masks that spread panic with their attacks and have set off the alarm at governments and corporations around the world, reveal their goals and targets. The notorious “Anonymous” came on TV screens last night, in War Zone’s new two-part documentary “Soldiers With No Name”. via War Zone
The documentary also feature interviews with Wired journalist Quinn
A war correspondent and photographer, Sotiris has been filming news & current affairs documentaries since 2003, highlighting the stories of people in crisis and the contemporary issues of the world we live in. The awarded War Zone documentary series takes the viewer to the world’s hot spots and the centre of international news developments. Each feature of 60 minutes, is the result of long-term journalist research characterized by cinematic narrative, quality image & detailed editing. War Zone airs on Mega TV Greece.Norton and Chief Technology Officer of Application Security, INC, Josh Shaul.
The purpose of Project PM’s wiki is to provide a centralized, actionable data set regarding the intelligence contracting industry, the PR industry’s interface with totalitarian regimes, the mushrooming infosec/”cybersecurity” industry, and other issues constituting threats to human rights, civic transparency, individual privacy, and the health of democratic institutions.
This is a crowdsourced investigation focused on research and analysis. If you care that the surveillance state is expanding in capabilities and intent without being effectively opposed by the population of the West, you can assist in making this an actionable resource for journalists, activists, and other interested parties. Consider doing a bit of research on the companies and government agencies listed on this wiki, or even adding new topic for investigation by our participants. The best place to start is the Community Portal. We also need help adding much more to Media Reports.
Do not editorialize when contributing; simply add pertinent facts and link to source material. Employ the same writing style one finds at Wikipedia. If you’d like to contribute information to our data set without editing the wiki yourself, you may do so by sending the info to us at [email protected] (more secure means of communication can be arranged if you care to send an anonymous e-mail to that account). If you have personal knowledge about this topic for any reason, please consider letting us know via that e-mail address. Better yet, you can download an IRC client and join us at ircs://project-pm.org:6697 (If you’re not familiar with IRC, you can use this Mibbit, weblink to connect to our IRC chat server) Those interested in starting groups similar to Project PM should see our Guide to Pursuants.
Editing the Wiki
Public editing has returned to the wiki, feel free to contribute research to this project. Only registered accounts may edit, and you may need to recreate your account if you had one previously.
To browse through the complete list of pages on this site, click here. Some important pages are listed below. For a list of terms used in these articles, you can check the Glossary and Acronyms
As reported by Fox News yesterday, LulzSec “mastermind” and Anonymous hacker Sabu (real name: Hector Xavier Monsegur) was flipped by the FBI. Big surprise. Give the FBI a cookie.
There has been a widespread belief that Sabu was a rat for quite some time within the hacking community—an August 2011 chat between Sabu and Virus, for instance. Virus quite prophetically wrote in that infamous chat: “I’m absolutely positive, you already got raided, and are setting your friends up and when they’re done draining you for information and arrests they’ll sentence you and it’ll make nose.”
Beyond that, in a community wherein anyone can have a voice, it stands to reason that subversive government influences are present, whether passively watching or actively suggesting. Disinformation, false flag operations, and immunity: these are the human intelligence gathering techniques that spy agencies use to infiltrate movements.
With that in mind, one of two possibilities exist: The FBI has transformed Anonymous into one monolithic false-flag operation, or agents take down hackers the way they take down other targets—with one or multiple informants. Judging the FBI’s efforts purely on the frequency of Anonymous’ activities throughout the last year, it’s probably safe to say that the FBI hasn’t accomplished the former.
If this conclusion is wildly off-base, and the former is true, then one has to entertain the following possibilities: the Stratfor hack was socially engineered by the FBI; Stratfor allowed it; and the FBI manipulated Anonymous into a partnership with WikiLeaks in the publication of the Global Intelligence Files. Then, of course, one must wonder if WikiLeaks itself is not a false-flag operation. This scenario seems rather unlikely, especially in a world where those who attempt to regulate the Internet are always one step behind.
Where then does this leave Anonymous and its supporters?
Again, judging from Anonymous’ efforts in the last year, which included a hybridization with Occupy Wall Street, the Stratfor hack, a partnership with WikiLeaks, an infiltration of the FBI and Scotland Yard’s conference call on Anonymous, Operation ANTI-ACTA (which struck the Polish government), and the CIAPC hack (following Elisa’s blockade of The Pirate Bay), amongst other projects; it would seem seem that Anonymous, as a global collective, has grown far beyond LulzSec and Sabu’s influence—that it has indeed shed Sabu’s influence.
Anonymous’ efforts are truly global now and ever-shifting. Unless people believe that stool pigeon Sabu’s opera singing is evidence of some international, multi-state false flag conspiracy to nab radical hackers, Anonymous likely won’t be slowing down anytime soon.
Here’s a suggestion to the FBI: Maybe you should spend a little less time pursuing Anonymous and put more effort into bringing to justice the white-collar criminals who crashed the economy in 2008, thereby pocketing billions and evaporating middle class savings, delaying retirement, and sending families into the grip of poverty; driving individuals to suicide, or illegal and prescription drug use to numb the pain; to theft, alcoholism, and welfare that the GOP hates so much; and saddling college graduates with hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt from which they won’t soon liberate themselves.
Yes, one can see how a DDoS attack launched against Sony Pictures would be a priority. The FBI does work for politicians after all, who are kept in office by the campaign donations of corporations.
Indeed, the FBI, like Sabu himself, knows the following maxim all too well: you’re always somebody’s bitch.
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Applies to Act of Decrypting Data
San Francisco – A federal appeals court has found a Florida man’s constitutional rights were violated when he was imprisoned for refusing to decrypt data on several devices. This is the first time an appellate court has ruled the 5th Amendment protects against forced decryption – a major victory for constitutional rights in the digital age.
In this case, titled United States v. Doe, FBI agents seized two laptops and five external hard drives from a man they were investigating but were unable to access encrypted data they believed was stored on the devices via an encryption program called TrueCrypt. When a grand jury ordered the man to produce the unencrypted contents of the drives, he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to do so. The court held him in contempt and sent him to jail.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed an amicus brief under seal, arguing that the man had a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and that the government’s attempt to force him to decrypt the data was unconstitutional. The 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling that the act of decrypting data is testimonial and therefore protected by the Fifth Amendment. Furthermore, the government’s limited offer of immunity in this case was insufficient to protect his constitutional right, because it did not extend to the government’s use of the decrypted data as evidence against him in a prosecution.
“The government’s attempt to force this man to decrypt his data put him in the Catch-22 the 5th Amendment was designed to prevent – having to choose between self-incrimination or risking contempt of court,” said EFF Senior Staff Attorney Marcia Hofmann. “We’re pleased the appeals court recognized the important constitutional issues at stake here, and we hope this ruling will discourage the government from using abusive grand jury subpoenas to try to expose data people choose to protect with encryption. ”
A similar court battle is ongoing in Colorado, where a woman named Ramona Fricosu has been ordered by the court to decrypt the contents of a laptop seized in an investigation into fraudulent real estate transactions. EFF also filed a friend of the court brief in that case, arguing that Fricosu was being forced to become a witness against herself. An appeals court recently rejected her appeal, and she has been ordered to decrypt the information this month.
“As we move into an increasingly digital world, we’re seeing more and more questions about how our constitutional rights play out with regards to the technology we use every day,” said EFF Staff Attorney Hanni Fakhoury. “This is a case where the appeals court got it right – protecting the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”
John Doe was represented by Chet Kaufman of the Federal Public Defender’s Office in Tallahassee.
LONDON–Today WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files – more than five million emails from the Texas-headquartered “global intelligence” company Stratfor. The emails date from between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal’s Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defense Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor’s web of informers, pay-off structure, payment-laundering techniques and psychological methods, for example:
“[Y]ou have to take control of him. Control means financial, sexual or psychological control… This is intended to start our conversation on your next phase” – CEO George Friedman to Stratfor analyst Reva Bhalla on 6 December 2011, on how to exploit an Israeli intelligence informant providing information on the medical condition of the President of Venezuala, Hugo Chavez.
The material contains privileged information about the US government’s attacks against Julian Assange and WikiLeaks and Stratfor’s own attempts to subvert WikiLeaks. There are more than 4,000 emails mentioning WikiLeaks or Julian Assange. The emails also expose the revolving door that operates in private intelligence companies in the United States. Government and diplomatic sources from around the world give Stratfor advance knowledge of global politics and events in exchange for money. The Global Intelligence Files exposes how Stratfor has recruited a global network of informants who are paid via Swiss banks accounts and pre-paid credit cards. Stratfor has a mix of covert and overt informants, which includes government employees, embassy staff and journalists around the world.
The material shows how a private intelligence agency works, and how they target individuals for their corporate and government clients. For example, Stratfor monitored and analysed the online activities of Bhopal activists, including the “Yes Men”, for the US chemical giant Dow Chemical. The activists seek redress for the 1984 Dow Chemical/Union Carbide gas disaster in Bhopal, India. The disaster led to thousands of deaths, injuries in more than half a million people, and lasting environmental damage.
Stratfor has realised that its routine use of secret cash bribes to get information from insiders is risky. In August 2011, Stratfor CEO George Friedman confidentially told his employees: “We are retaining a law firm to create a policy for Stratfor on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. I don’t plan to do the perp walk and I don’t want anyone here doing it either.”
Stratfor’s use of insiders for intelligence soon turned into a money-making scheme of questionable legality. The emails show that in 2009 then-Goldman Sachs Managing Director Shea Morenz and Stratfor CEO George Friedman hatched an idea to “utilise the intelligence” it was pulling in from its insider network to start up a captive strategic investment fund. CEO George Friedman explained in a confidential August 2011 document, marked DO NOT SHARE OR DISCUSS: “What StratCap will do is use our Stratfor’s intelligence and analysis to trade in a range of geopolitical instruments, particularly government bonds, currencies and the like”. The emails show that in 2011 Goldman Sach’s Morenz invested “substantially” more than $4million and joined Stratfor’s board of directors. Throughout 2011, a complex offshore share structure extending as far as South Africa was erected, designed to make StratCap appear to be legally independent. But, confidentially, Friedman told StratFor staff: “Do not think of StratCap as an outside organisation. It will be integral… It will be useful to you if, for the sake of convenience, you think of it as another aspect of Stratfor and Shea as another executive in Stratfor… we are already working on mock portfolios and trades”. StratCap is due to launch in 2012.
The Stratfor emails reveal a company that cultivates close ties with US government agencies and employs former US government staff. It is preparing the 3-year Forecast for the Commandant of the US Marine Corps, and it trains US marines and “other government intelligence agencies” in “becoming government Stratfors”. Stratfor’s Vice-President for Intelligence, Fred Burton, was formerly a special agent with the US State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service and was their Deputy Chief of the counterterrorism division. Despite the governmental ties, Stratfor and similar companies operate in complete secrecy with no political oversight or accountability. Stratfor claims that it operates “without ideology, agenda or national bias”, yet the emails reveal private intelligence staff who align themselves closely with US government policies and channel tips to the Mossad – including through an information mule in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Yossi Melman, who conspired with Guardian journalist David Leigh to secretly, and in violation of WikiLeaks’ contract with the Guardian, move WikiLeaks US diplomatic cables to Israel.
Ironically, considering the present circumstances, Stratfor was trying to get into what it called the leak-focused “gravy train” that sprung up after WikiLeaks’ Afghanistan disclosures:
“[Is it] possible for us to get some of that ‘leak-focused’ gravy train? This is an obvious fear sale, so that’s a good thing. And we have something to offer that the IT security companies don’t, mainly our focus on counter-intelligence and surveillance that Fred and Stick know better than anyone on the planet… Could we develop some ideas and procedures on the idea of ´leak-focused’ network security that focuses on preventing one’s own employees from leaking sensitive information… In fact, I’m not so sure this is an IT problem that requires an IT solution.”
Like WikiLeaks’ diplomatic cables, much of the significance of the emails will be revealed over the coming weeks, as our coalition and the public search through them and discover connections. Readers will find that whereas large numbers of Stratfor’s subscribers and clients work in the US military and intelligence agencies, Stratfor gave a complimentary membership to the controversial Pakistan general Hamid Gul, former head of Pakistan’s ISI intelligence service, who, according to US diplomatic cables, planned an IED attack on international forces in Afghanistan in 2006. Readers will discover Stratfor’s internal email classification system that codes correspondence according to categories such as ‘alpha’, ‘tactical’ and ‘secure’. The correspondence also contains code names for people of particular interest such as ‘Izzies’ (members of Hezbollah), or ‘Adogg’ (Mahmoud Ahmedinejad).
Stratfor did secret deals with dozens of media organisations and journalists – from Reuters to the Kiev Post. The list of Stratfor’s “Confederation Partners”, whom Stratfor internally referred to as its “Confed Fuck House” are included in the release. While it is acceptable for journalists to swap information or be paid by other media organisations, because Stratfor is a private intelligence organisation that services governments and private clients these relationships are corrupt or corrupting.
WikiLeaks has also obtained Stratfor’s list of informants and, in many cases, records of its payoffs, including $1,200 a month paid to the informant “Geronimo” , handled by Stratfor’s Former State Department agent Fred Burton.
WikiLeaks has built an investigative partnership with more than 25 media organisations and activists to inform the public about this huge body of documents. The organisations were provided access to a sophisticated investigative database developed by WikiLeaks and together with WikiLeaks are conducting journalistic evaluations of these emails. Important revelations discovered using this system will appear in the media in the coming weeks, together with the gradual release of the source documents.
Public partners in the investigation:
More than 25 media partners (others will be disclosed after their first publication):
Al Akhbar – Lebanon – http://english.al-akhbar.com
Al Masry Al Youm – Egypt – http://www.almasry-alyoum.com
Bivol – Bulgaria – http://bivol.bg
CIPER – Chile – http://ciperchile.cl
Dawn Media – Pakistan – http://www.dawn.com
L’Espresso – Italy – http://espresso.repubblica.it
La Repubblica – Italy – http://www.repubblica.it
La Jornada – Mexico – www.jornada.unam.mx/
La Nacion – Costa Rica – http://www.nacion.com
Malaysia Today – Malaysia – www.malaysia-today.net
McClatchy – United States – http://www.mcclatchy.com
Nawaat – Tunisia – http://nawaat.org
NDR/ARD – Germany – http://www.ard.de
Owni – France – http://owni.fr
Pagina 12 – Argentina – www.pagina12.com.ar
Plaza Publica – Guatemala – http://plazapublica.com.gt
Publico.es – Spain – www.publico.es
Rolling Stone – United States – http://www.rollingstone.com
Russia Reporter – Russia – http://rusrep.ru
Ta Nea – Greece –- http://www.tanea.gr
Taraf – Turkey – http://www.taraf.com.tr
The Hindu – India – www.thehindu.com
The Yes Men – Bhopal Activists – Global http://theyesmen.org
Nicky Hager for NZ Herald – New Zealand – http://www.nzherald.co.nz
Telecomix Crypto Munitions Bureau is part of Telecomix. This wiki is used for discussing technology and philosophy. This wiki is also essentially the technical twin to the political WeRebuild.EU wiki. Both share the same fundamental goal: To defend and increase information freedom.
A decentralized organization without membership. The bureaus goals are described in this paper issued by Cameron. Beyond that, we also do whatever we want.
This January 28marks International PrivacyDay. Different countriesaroundtheworld are celebrating this day with their own events. This year, we are honoring the day by calling attention to recent international privacy threats and interviewing data protection authorities, government officials, and activists to gain insight into various aspects of privacy rights and related legislation in their own respective countries.
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Throughout history, there have been a number of reasons why individuals have taken to writing or producing art under a pseudonym. In the 18th century, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay took on the pseudonym Publius to publish The Federalist Papers. In 19th century England, pseudonyms allowed women–like the Brontë sisters, who initially published under Currer, Ellis, and Acton Bell–to be taken seriously as writers.
Today, pseudonyms continue to serve a range of individuals, and for a variety of reasons. At EFF, we view anonymity as both a matter of free speech and privacy, but in light of International Privacy Day, January 28, this piece will focus mainly on the latter, looking at the ways in which the right to anonymity–or pseudonymity–is truly a matter of privacy.
Privacy from employers
Human beings are complex creatures with multiple interests. As such, many professionals use pseudonyms online to keep their employment separate from their personal life. One example of this is the Guardian columnist GrrlScientist who, upon discovering her Google+ account had been deleted for violating their “common name” policy, penned a piece explaining her need for privacy. Another example is prominent Moroccan blogger Hisham Khribchi, who has explained his use of a pseudonym, stating:
When I first started blogging I wanted my identity to remain secret because I didn’t want my online activity to interfere with my professional life. I wanted to keep both as separate as possible. I also wanted to use a fake name because I wrote about politics and I was critical of my own government. A pseudonym would shield me and my family from personal attacks. I wanted to have a comfortable space to express myself freely without having to worry about the police when I visit my family back in Morocco.
Though Khribchi’s reasoning is two-fold, his primary concern–even stronger than his need for protection from his government–was keeping his online life separate from his employment.
Even Wael Ghonim–the now-famous Egyptian who helped launch a revolution–conducted his activism under a pseudonym…not to protect himself from the Egyptian government, but rather because he was an employee of Google and wanted to maintain an air of neutrality.
Privacy from the political scene
In 2008, an Alaskan blogger known as “Alaska Muckraker” (or AKM) rose to fame for her vocal criticism of fellow Alaskan and then-McCain-running-mate Sarah Palin. Later, after inveighing against a rude email sent to constituents by Alaska State Representative Mike Doogan, AKM was outed–by Doogan–who wrote that his “own theory about the public process is you can say what you want, as long as you are willing to stand behind it using your real name.”
AKM, a blogger decidedly committing an act of journalism, could have had any number of reasons to remain anonymous. As she later wrote:
I might be a state employee. I might not want my children to get grief at school. I might be fleeing from an ex-partner who was abusive and would rather he not know where I am. My family might not want to talk to me anymore. I might alienate my best friend. Maybe I don’t feel like having a brick thrown through my window. My spouse might work for the Palin administration. Maybe I’d just rather people not know where I live or where I work. Or none of those things may be true. None of my readers, nor Mike Doogan had any idea what my personal circumstances might be.
Though Doogan claimed that AKM gave up her right to anonymity when her blog began influencing public policy, he’s wrong. In the United States, the right to anonymity is protected by the First Amendment and must remain so, to ensure both the free expression and privacy rights of citizens.
Similarly, in 2009, Ed Whelans, a former official with the Department of Justice, outed anonymous blogger John Blevins–a professor at the South Texas College of Law–in the National Review, calling him “irresponsible”, and a “coward.” Blevins took the fall gracefully, later explaining why he had chosen to blog under a pseudonym. Like Khribchi, Blevins’ reasons were numerous: He feared losing tenure and legal clients, but he also feared putting the jobs of family members in the political space at risk.
Privacy from the public eye
A friend of mine–let’s call him Joe–is the sibling of a famous celebrity. But while he’s very proud of his sibling, Joe learned early on that not everyone has his best interests at heart. Therefore, Joe devised a pseudonym to use online in order to protect the privacy of himself and his family.
In Joe’s case, the threat is very real: celebrities are regularly stalked, their houses broken into. His pseudonym keeps him feeling “normal” in his online interactions, while simultaneously protecting his sibling and the rest of his family from invasions of privacy.
Achieving anonymity online
Anonymity and pseudonymity may seem increasingly difficult to achieve online. Not only do companies like Facebook restrict your right to use a pseudonym, but even when you do think you’re anonymous, you might not be–as blogger Rosemary Port found out in 2009 after Google turned over her name in response to a court order.
While we should continue to fight for our privacy under the law, the best thing we can do as users to who value our right to anonymity is to use tools like Tor. Anonymous bloggers can use Global Voices Advocacy’s online guide to blogging anonymously with WordPress and Tor. And all Internet users should educate themselves about what is–and isn’t–private on their online accounts and profiles.
Anonymous have unveiled their second major release for this week’s installment of FuckFBIFriday. Their target this time around is Frank Wuterich, the US Marine that admitted to killing Iraqi civilians — and received no jail time for his crime.
Early Friday afternoon, members of the loose-knit online collective Anonymous began circulating news that the website for Puckett and Faraj, the high-profile attorneys that represented Sgt. Frank Wuterich in his recent trial, had been hacked. Wuterich admitted to leading Marines into two civilian homes in Haditha, Iraq in 2005, massacring 24 civilians including women, children and an elderly man confined to a wheelchair.
In response, hacktivists with Anonymous have uncovered gigabytes worth of correspondence from Sgt. Wuterich’s attorneys and affiliated parties.
Last month, a military tribunal finally finished their hearing on Sgt. Wuterich, more than six years after the notorious slaughter. Insiders reported before his sentencing that he was expected to receive only 90 days behind bars. When the case ended, he was sentenced to zero.
Anonymous members have hacked into the website for Sgt. Wuterich’s attorneys and have since defaced it with a detailed message explaining how the self-proclaimed “cold-blooded killer” became their latest target.
“As part of our ongoing efforts to expose the corruption of the court systems and the brutality of US imperialism, we want to bring attention to USMC SSgt Frank Wuterich who along with his squad murdered dozens of unarmed civilians during the Iraqi Occupation,” reads a message now on the homepage of his attorney’s website. “Can you believe this scumbag had his charges reduced to involuntary manslaughter and got away with only a pay cut?”
“Meanwhile,” adds the Anonymous-penned message, “Bradley Manning who was brave enough to risk his life and freedom to expose the truth about government corruption is threatened with life imprisonment.”
“When justice cannot be found within the confines of their crooked court systems, we must seek revenge on the streets and on the internet – and dealing out swift retaliation is something we are particularly good at. Worry not comrades, it’s time to deliver some epic ownage.”
In addition to defacing the website of his attorneys, nearly 3 gigabytes of email correspondence belonging to his attorneys have been leaked online.
“And to add a few layers of icing to this delicious caek, we got the usual boatloads of embarrassing personal information. How do you think the world will react when they find out Neal Puckett and his marine buddies have been making crude jokes about the incident where marines have been caught on video pissing on dead bodies in Afghanistan? Or that he regularly corresponds with and receives funding from former marine Don Greenlaw who runs the racist blog http://snooper.wordpress.com? We believe it is time to release all of their private information and court evidence to the world and conduct a People’s trial of our own,” writes Anonymous
The announcement this afternoon comes only hours after Anonymous operatives posted a recorded phone message that they intercepted from the FBI and Scotland Yard. Hours later, The Associated Press reports that the FBI confirmed the interception and says it is going after the parties responsible.
His research is generally focused on the topic of online privacy. This includes both consumer issues (such as online tracking) as well as government surveillance. His Ph.D dissertation is focused on the role that companies play in either resisting or facilitating surveillance of their customers.
He has used the Freedom of Information Act and several other investigative techniques to shed light on the scale of and the methods by which the US government spies on Internet communications and mobile telephones. This work has been cited by (pdf) the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, and featured on the Colbert Report.
He was the first ever in-house technologist at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)’s Division of Privacy and Identity Protection. Prior to his year in government, he created a privacy enhancing browser add-on that was downloaded more than 700,000 times in its first year before he sold it to Abine, Inc.
He has worked at or interned with the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Northern California, NTT DoCoMo Euro Labs, Google, Apple and IBM Research Zurich.
Publications
Can You See Me Now: Toward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact [pdf]
Stephanie K. Pell and Christopher Soghoian
In Progress
The Law Enforcement Surveillance Reporting Gap [pdf]
Christopher Soghoian
In Progress
An End to Privacy Theater:
Exposing and Discouraging Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government [pdf]
Christopher Soghoian
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology Vol. 12, No. 1, 2011.
Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era [pdf]
Christopher Soghoian
Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2010.
Manipulation and Abuse of the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies [Website]
Christopher Soghoian
First Monday, Volume 14, Number 8, August 2009.
Deep Packet Inspection — Bring It On [Website]
Christopher Soghoian
Invited contribution to Deep Packet Inspection, A Collection of Essays from Industry Experts,
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, April 2009.
Merx: Secure and Privacy Preserving Delegated Payments
Christopher Soghoian and Imad Aad Trust 2009, April 2009.
Legal Risks For Phishing Researchers [pdf]
Christopher Soghoian
The Third Anti-Phishing Working Group eCrime Researchers Summit, October 2008.
Mantis: A High-Performance, Anonymity Preserving, P2P Network [pdf]
Steve Bono, Christopher Soghoian and Fabian Monrose
Johns Hopkins University Information Security Institute Technical Report, TR-2004-01-B-ISI-JHU. June
As part of their intelligence-gathering operation, the group gained access to a listserv used by Occupy Wall Street organizers called September17discuss. On September17discuss, organizers hash out tactics and plan events, conduct post-mortems of media appearances, and trade the latest protest gossip. On Friday, Ryan leaked thousands of September17discuss emails to conservative blogger Andrew Breitbart, who is now using them to try to smear Occupy Wall Street as an anarchist conspiracy to disrupt global markets.
A few thoughts on the “hacktivist” group Anonymous that came out of Josh Corman and Brian “Jericho” Martin’s keynote at the
As Corman noted, this amorphous thing we call “Anonymous” has become the perfect scape goat. Anonymous members continually drop in and out of affiliation with, or actions taken on behalf of, the group.
Does Anonymous agree with the proposals? Anonymous has no unified voice, the keynoters said, so it’s a moot question — it is, after all, a composite, rather than a singular, monolithic group, and there are any number of levels of allegiance and reasons for participating.
“And to add a few layers of icing to this delicious caek, we got the usual boatloads of embarrassing personal information. How do you think the world will react when they find out Neal Puckett and his marine buddies have been making crude jokes about the incident where marines have been caught on video pissing on dead bodies in Afghanistan? Or that he regularly corresponds with and receives funding from former marine Don Greenlaw who runs the racist blog http://snooper.wordpress.com? We believe it is time to release all of their private information and court evidence to the world and conduct a People’s trial of our own,” writes Anonymous
